Aggregation when Markets do not Clear by Andreassen, Leif

Discussion Papers No. 139 • Statistics Norway, February 1995
Leif Andreassen
Aggregation when Markets do
not Clear
Abstract
This paper presents a method for aggregation across markets in a Non-Walrasian model, focusing mainly
on labor markets. The method utilizes a probabilistic approach based on aggregating across virtual price
functions instead of demand functions or budget shares as is normally done. By assuming log-linear virtual
price functions and using the GEV distribution, it is possible to identify most of the micro structure of an
economy in disequilibrium from observed aggregate variables. The paper discusses different possible
indicators of disequilibrium in the labor market and presents some illustrative estimation results.
Keywords Aggregation, disequilibrium, non-Walrasian models.
JEL dassifkation: El, CS, DS.
Acknowledgement This paper is based on part of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Oslo. I
would like to thank my thesis advisor John K. Dagsvik for his support and advice. I am also grateful to Erik
Bjorn and Tor Jakob Klette for their valuable comments. This research was supported by the Norwegian
Research Council for Science and the Humanities.
Address: Leif Andreassen, Statistics Norway, Research Department,
P.O.Box 8131 Dep., N-0033 Oslo, Norway. E-mail: lanOssb.no
1 Introduction
This paper presents an empirical method for aggregating micro markets in dise-
quilibrium. Aggregation is done using a probabilistic (stochastic) approach based
on the virtual price formulation of a non-Walrasian model presented in Andreassen
(1995). This approach can be viewed both as an extension of the virtual price ap-
proach of Lee (1986) and of the smoothing by aggregation approach first suggested
by Muellbauer (1978). The use of virtual prices makes it possible to take into ac-
count that some agents may be rationed in some markets or that their optimization
may lead to corner solutions. Such considerations are especially important in the
labor market.
The present aggregation approach is based on many restrictive assumptions, and
should therefore be viewed as a tentative step towards understanding how different
distributions of technology and tastes (and thereby of rationing) influence aggregate
relationships. An important aspect of the paper is that it discusses the empirical
interpretation of the probability of a match in a market and looks at the general re-
strictions inherent in such an approach. The main part of the paper gives conditions
under which it is possible to estimate the structural parameters in a multi-sectoral
macroeconomic model from aggregate data when there is rationing in the labor
market. In addition the aggregation approach used leads to different indicators of
disequilbrium. The results of the paper are illustrated through some rudimentary
estimation results leading to the preliminary conclusion that the model is misspec-
ified due to its static nature and that future research should therefore concentrate
on extending the model to a dynamic setting.
There is a large literature on the estimation of econometric disequilibrium mod-
els, starting with the seminal works of Fair and Jaffee (1972) and Rosen and Quandt
(1978) which examined single markets under fixed prices. Estimation methods for
two- market models, such as the theoretical neo-Keynesian models first developed
by Barro and Grossman (1971) and Malinvaud (1977), were developed by among
others Ito (1980). Recent work within the neo-Keynesian econometric framework
take as a starting point micro markets and use the so-called smoothing by aggregation
approach. This method has been utilized in among others Burkett (1988), Lambert
(1988) and Drèze and Bean (1990). Micro markets are taken to be small efficient
markets where it seems reasonable to postulate that only one side of the market can
be rationed at one time. This assumption is commonly referred to as the min con-
dition and implies that all advantageous trades are carried out in the market. The
smoothing by aggregation approach assumes that supply and demand in the micro
markets can be modeled as consisting of a structural part and a stochastic residual.
Assuming that the residuals are distributed in the same manner in all markets, ag-
gregation to the macro level is achieved by integrating over micro markets. At any
one time some micro markets will be in excess demand while others will be in excess
supply, so that at the macro level both sides of the market may be partially rationed
at the same time. In a neo-Keynesian macro model this means that there can be
Keynesian unemployment at the same time as there is classical unemployment. The
smoothing by aggregation approach starts with micro demands and supplies and is
not based on explicit utility and profit maximization.
A survey of theoretical and econometric modeling of disequilibrium is given in
Andreassen (1993). A recent review of the main advances made in the applied
disequilibrium litterature is given in Laroque and Salanie (1993). They especially
discuss the problems connected with aggregation and price dynamics.
Lee (1986) suggests an alternative method for estimating econometric models
with many markets based on using virtual prices to describe disequilibrium. By
using the notion of virtual prices he overcomes earlier difficulties in finding a com-
putationally tractable method for estimating models with more than two markets.
Lee's method is based on representative agents without explicitly considering ag-
gregation. Andreassen (1995) extends Lee's approach by taking into account that
there can be many agents, including government production, an open economy and
by explicitly discussing the impact corner solutions have on estimation. Despite the
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use of simple specifications, it is apparent from this paper that when there are a
large number of markets, the computational burden of estimation becomes heavy
due to the large number of possible rationing regimes. It therefore seems neces-
sary in multi-market econometric work to either work within a representative agent
framework or, as in this paper, to develop methods for aggregating across micro
markets.
The aggregation method presented in the present paper is based on specifying
the distribution of virtual prices across the population. Assuming, as in Lee (1986),
that they are log-linear and, as in Andreassen (1995), that they are extreme value
distributed, it is possible to use aggregate time series data to estimate and analyze
structural relationships in the labor market in the presence of rationing and corner
solutions. The exogenous wage distribution is also assumed to be extreme value
distributed. The aggregation method discussed in this paper is explicitly based on
utility and profit maximization through the use of virtual prices.
The economic model on which aggregation is based is the non- Walrasian model
presented in Andreassen (1995). The model is only concerned with short term equi-
libria and considers investment, exports, and government behavior (tax rates and
the budget constraint of the government firms) as exogenous, along with prices and
wages. The main reason for considering these as exogenous is analytical tractabil-
ity, but it can be argued that decisions regarding these variables cover a longer time
period than decisions regarding consumption and production. Imports, the trade
surplus, tax revenue, the public budget deficit, and changes in the money supply
are endogenous. Production and consumption inputs of a good are transacted on
the same product market at the same price. There is one non-produced commodity
in the model which will be referred to as money. Money enters both the utility
and production functions as a means to facilitate transactions and because it is the
sole means of transferring liquidity over time (there are no financial markets in the
model).
The model is based on the assumptions that prices and wages do not instanta-
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neously clear markets (though they may be flexible over time) and that the economy
at any time is in a Drèze equilibrium. In a Drèze equilibrium all transactions are
the result of utility and profit maximization subject to all quantity constraints that
exist. In addition only one side of each market can be rationed at a given time.
An important assumption is that each combination of firm and individual is
considered a separate micro labor market, implying that the number of micro labor
markets in the model is equal to the number of consumers times the number of
firms. This assumption plays a vital role in the aggregation procedure because
it implies that there will be only one seller and one buyer in each micro labor
market. In principle it is possible for a firm to use all types of labor and all types
of commodities as inputs and it is possible for an individual to be employed in all
the firms in the economy and to consume all types of commodities. Such a large
and general opportunity set both for the firm and especially for the individual will
naturally lead to a large number of corner solutions which it is necessary to take
into consideration. The assumption that each combination of firm and worker is a
separate labor market can be seen as an extreme way of modeling the heterogeneity
of jobs and labor. It does not seem plausible to make a similar assumption for goods.
Firms are for example rarely interested in the characteristics of their customers. This
is the main reason why we in the following concentrate on aggregating across labor
markets.
Government firms are included in the model to explicitly take into account that a
significant share of employment in many economies takes place in the public sector.
Another reason to include government production is that it constitutes a significant
portion of the output in many economies and is often subject to severe rationing
(for example health care). Government production is assumed to be used only by
consumers, consists only of individual products (we assume there are no public
goods), is not an input to other production, is not an investment good, and is never
exported. The government sector may buy investment goods from private firms and
from abroad. It is assumed that the government levies two types of taxes, one on
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labor income and one on commodities (production and consumption inputs) and
hands out lump-sum subsidies. There is no tax on investment goods or on exports.
The next section discusses some general issues which arise in the aggregation
approach used in this paper. For this approach to be empirically useful it is nec-
essary to interpret empirically the probability that a certain individual works in a
particular firms, the probability that the individual wishes to work in this firm, and
the probability that the firm wishes to hire this individual. An important conclu-
sion drawn from this discussion is that seemingly innocuous assumptions lead to
fairly strong restrictions which apply irrespective of how the details of the model
are formulated.
Section 3 discusses the virtual prices on which the aggregation method is based
under assumptions that imply log-linear virtual prices. These virtual prices are
those that arise in the model discussed in more detail in Andreassen (1995). The
parameters in these relationships can be interpreted as structural parameters in the
agents' utility and production functions.
Section 4 describes how unobserved heterogeneity is assumed to be distributed
across individuals and firms. Section 5 derives the labor force probabilities implied
by the model and functional forms discussed in section 3 and the distributional
assumptions made in section 4. It also presents aggregation results for the goods
markets and discusses estimation based on the derived aggregate relationships. Fur-
thermore, in this section different indicators of disequilibrium in the labor market
are discussed and the papers aggregation approach is compared to the smoothing
by aggregation method.
Finally, in section 6 som empirical illustrations are presented for a model with
one type of individual and four types of firms. The estimation is based on fairly
short time series covering 16 years and some of the data are fairly poor (for example
data on money demand). For this reason the empirical results presented are mainly
of an illustrative nature.
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2 Empirical interpretation of labor market prob-
abilities
Before discussing the specific assumptions and specifications employed in this paper,
it is important to understand some general restrictions inherent in the probabilistic
approach used. Central to this approach is the probability, as seen by the econo-
metrician, that there is a match in a micro market, P(rik > 0), where /7k is the
transacted amount of labor supplied by individual i to firm k. If there is such a
match we must have that the min condition is satisfied,
17k
 > 0 = minYL, ipk), (2.1)
where ifk
 and 1Y, are respectively the Clower supply and the Clower demand for labor
in the micro market consisting of consumer i and firm k. Clower demands (supplies)
were first suggested in Clower (1965). They are the demand (supply) for a type of
labor which arises when maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint and
all quantity constraints except the quantity constraint which applies to the market
in question. This in constrast to Drèze demands (supplies) which are the result of
ma3dmzation subject to all the constraints which apply. Since the Drèze demands
take all constraints into account they will be equal to the observed transactions
and will not signal any rationing. As long as we assume that the min condition
/7k
 = min(a, /6) applies, the use of Clower demands (supplies) to signal rationing
will not contradict our assumption of a Drèze equilibrium.
In the present context a match does not have any search theoretical content
(though it is easy to agree that ideally it should), but only implies that min(a, >
O. The probability 13 (rik
 > 0) therefore does not reflect uncertainty on the part of
the agents, but only describes the econometrician's knowledge (or lack of knowledge)
about the behavior at the micro level.
The probability P(/7k
 > 0) is not readily observable, but under certain assump-
tions can be indirectly observed from observations of the number of persons em-
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ployed, Q. One of these assumptions is that Q can be given the probabilistic inter-
pretation
Q = N • P 	> 0) ,(Em
k=1
	 (2.2)
where N is the total number of potential employed (which can for example be as-
sumed to be all individuals between the ages of 16 and 74) and M is the total
number of potential firms. Equation (2.2) says that total number of employed per-
sons is equal to the number of potential employed times the probability that any
one individual is employed. The employment rate Q/N can in the same manner be
interpreted as the probability of an individual working in at least one firm,
Q
N P (E istck >k=1
=	 — (1 — P (I k > 0))M 	 (2.3)
where (1 — P(17/, > 0))m is the probability of individual i not working in any firm.
The econometrician does not observe any differences among the different persons or
firms (any heterogeneity is unobserved) and therefore takes the probability 13 (/71, > 0)
to be the same for all i and k. The expected (average) number of jobs held by an
individual given that he is employed, A, can be written
= EP(/7k > 0 fE/7k >
k=1	 k=1
M • P (1 ,7k > 0) 
P (E ikt4L 1 17k > 0)
MN
Q—P(1 31 > 0)	 (2.4)
where the last equalities follow from equation (2.2). Combining equations (2.3) and
(2.4) and rearranging leads to
11 •— —
Q ) = A Q log(1 — P(/:k > 0)) N	 N	 P(171, > 13)
	
(2.5)o ( 
When there are many micro labor markets we can assume that P(17k > 0) is small'
and therefore that
log(1 — 13 (41 > 0))
	_1 (2.6)
P(17k
 > 0)
when log denotes the natural logarithm. Setting this expression equal to -1 implies
that the average number of jobs held by an employed individual will be
N
log(1 — —Q ).	 (2.7)Q	 N
Assuming as an example that the employment rate is QIN = 0.685 (as observed
in Norway in 1991), we get that the aver* number of jobs held by an employed
individual will be A = 1.65. From the Norwegian Survey of Living 1991 we have
that over a five year period the average number of jobs held was 1.76. Equation
(2.7) implies that the employment rate determines the average number of jobs held
by the individuals so that an increase in the employment ratio QIN will increase
A. It is important to note that these results do not depend on how we specify our
model later in the paper, though the above results do depend on P(171, > 0) being
small. If the approximation in equation (2.6) holds, we have that equations (2.4)
and (2.7) imply that
Qm • P(1,7,{ > o) = —log(1 — —N-). (2.8)
From equation (2.8) it is apparant that we cannot identify M and P(17k > 0) sep-
arately. The number of potential firms M is unobservable and at the same time
constitutes the set over which the probability P(Vick > 0) is defined. Giving the vari-
able M an arbitrary value can therefore be viewed as a necessary normalization of
the size of the potential economy. If we exogenously determine the value of M, we
then can calculate P(17k > 0) as
P(ri > 0) = — —1 log(1 — —Q ),k N
logon—P c >o)) PV'If P(/':k > 0) = 0.1 then 
	py:k>0)	 = —1.05, while if	 :k > 0) = 0.9 then
log(i-P(lk>o))
 = —2.56. In section 6 we find that P(l) is of a magnitude of 10-5 to 10- 6.P(zL>o)
(2.9)
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and the number of firms actually observed, ì t2í, will be
N
ici = m .P (Eck >
=	 - (1 - p(17,, > 0))N )	 (2.10)
There are two other important probabilities which are central to the aggregation
approach discussed in the following. One is the probability that individual i wishes
to work in firm k, P (lfic
 > 0), and the other is the probability that firm k wishes
to hire individual i, 13(1R > 0). Assuming that a value for M has been specified,
these probabilities can be found from the -number of unemployed persons U and
the number of vacancies V. It seems reasonable to interpret these two observations
differently. To see this, let "a be a variable that is equal to 1 if firm k wishes to
employ person i (implying that /E, > 0) and 0 otherwise. The number of persons the
firms wish to employ can then be written E  A reasonable probabilistic
interpretation of V will therefore be
= 4.11r	 P (Iik = 1) — N	 P (17k
 > 0)
= M [N - P(15; > 0) — N - P(171, > 0)] .	 (2.11)
In equation (2.11) we have that N -13 (1g, > 0) is the expected number of employees
firm k wishes to employ and N • P(1 > 0) is the expected number the firm actually
employs. Taking the difference and multiplying with the total number of potential
firms gives us the number of vacancies.
The number of unemployed, U, must be interpreted differently, because in most
labor force surveys individuals are only asked whether they desire a job or not.
Letting Ji be a variable that is equal to 1 if individual i wishes to work at least in
one firm (implying that Eiktli 1f > 0) and 0 otherwise, the number of individuals who
desire a job will be Ji and the number of unemployed will be U = — Q.
A probabilistic interpretation of U is thereby
U = N [P(	 irk > o)—P(1 > )] .	 (2.12)
k=1 	 k=1
1 1
Equation (2.12) says that the total number of unemployed is equal to the number of
individuals times the probability that a random individual wishes to work without
finding employment.
In the same manner as for P(En
 1 > 0), we can write P(En. qk >13) as
,Af
P (E > 0) = 1 — (1 P(1 S > 0))m 	(2.13)
k=1
For a given M the probability PA > 0) can be calculated by substituting from
(2.3) and (2.13) into (2.12) leading to
P(l> 0) = 1 —
	
Q  r
•N
(2.14)
Substituting from equation (2.9) into (2.11) gives us the probability P(lß > 0),
v
	i
	Qpg> o) = — — — 10g(1 — 70.N M (2.15)
It is important to note that equations (2.14) and (2.15) are slightly different in
structure, due to the different interpretations of U and V.
In the following we will present an aggregation method based on the assumption
that the probabilities PA > 0), P (1g > 0), and P(17k > 0) can be observed for
groups of individuals and firms as discussed above. The relationships derived in
this section and the inherent restrictions of our approach will therefore apply to our
model irrespective of our choices of functional forms or distributional assumptions.
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3 Virtual prices
Aggregation is in the following based on the model presented in Andreassen (1995),
which has four types of agents: Private firms competing in world markets, pri-
vate firms sheltered from international competition, government firms, and con-
sumers/workers. Consumers maximize utility, private firms maximize profits con-
strained by their revenues in the previous period while the government firms maxi-
mize profits given an exogenously (politically) set budget constraint. All agents are
price takers in both input and output markets.
Stochastic aggregation assumes that unobserved heterogeneity among firms and
individuals can be modeled by treating the unobservables as random variables with
conventional distribution functions. It can be argued that such a parsimonious
modeling of unobserved heterogeneity is more realistic for parts of the labor market
than for the labor market as a whole. Different segments of the labor market are
also of interest in themselves. The total labor market is therefore assumed to be
divided into different aggregate submarkets characterized by combinations of type
of consumer and type of firm. All consumers who are of certain type have similar
utility functions and all firms which are of a certain type have similar production
functions. It is at the level of the labor submarket that the paper attempts to derive
aggregate expressions. In principle there is no limit to how many such submarkets
on has, but the number of micro markets in each aggregate subrnarket must be fairly
large, since we assume that unobserved heterogeneity within each submarket can be
approximated by continuous probability distributions. The submarkets must also
be such that there are reasonable aggregate data available. The similarities within
each type can be thought of as being the result of earlier choices regarding education
in the case of the consumer and choice of production capital for firms.
In the following we utilize a different indexation from that of Andreassen (1995)
to take into account labor submarkets. Types of private firms are indexed j =
1, - , J where the number of firms of type j is M. , while types of consumers are
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indexed h = J +1, • •• , J where the number of consumers of type h is Nh. Firms
of type j are in addition indexed by k = 1, . • . , Mi and consumers of type h by i =
1, • , Nh. Each combination of consumer type and type of firm, (h, j), is considered
an aggregate labor submarket. There are H • J such aggregate submarkets, each
consisting of Nh • Ali micro markets. We assume that firm types 1, • , Jp are private
firms while firm types 4 + 1, . • • , J are government firms.
In the following we assume that consumers and firms are never rationed in their
demand for private goods and that the consumers are always rationed in their de-
mand for government goods (firms do not use government goods). This can be
considered a special case of the model in Andreassen (1995), where consumers and
firms could be rationed in their demand for non-traded goods and where the gov-
ernment could be rationed in it's supply of goods. Private firms may be rationed in
their supply of goods.
All private firms are assumed to be profit maximizers and price takers in both
input and output markets. Each firm uses labor and output from other firms as
inputs and produces one product. The private firms do not use government goods
and services as inputs. The firms' investments, invjk, and capital stock, /qk are
considered exogenous. Production that goes to investment or export is considered
to be governed by long term contracts (longer than the period we look at) and is
therefore also considered exogenous. We let yjk be firm k of type j's production for
consumption and for use as inputs in other firms and let Yjk be this firm's production
for investment and export. The price for the first type of production, (1 — t2)pik,
may be different from the price of the second. The commodity tax rate t2 is the
same for all goods.
If there are imports of a good not produced nationally, we assume that there
is a hypothetical firm which could have produced the good but which finds such
production unprofitable. We assume a asymmetry between imports and exports.
Exports are governed by longer term contracts and are exogenous, while imports
are residually determined and endogenous.
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We assume that the length of production is one period, implying that for all
inputs that are chosen in the current period, output and the resulting revenues will
first accrue in the next period. This results in the private firm being constrained
by a budget constraint similar to that of the consumer. This approach is similar
to that taken in for example Böhm and Lévine (1979). It is a shortcoming of the
model that money is the only means of transferring purchasing power over several
periods. The firms cannot, for example, borrow to finance purchases of investment
goods or other inputs.- It is important in future research to include a more realistic
modeling of financial markets and a dynamic modeling of the firms' behavior.
Let /hijk be consumer i's supply of labor to firm k, when consumer i is of type
h and firm k belongs to firms of type j. Consumers have preferences both over
how many hours they work and where they work. This might reflect the different
working conditions in the different firms or the location of the firm in relationship
to the worker. The wage, Whijk, varies both over individuals and firms within the
aggregate labor submarket hj. The variable t 1h denotes the tax on wage income for
individuals of type h.
Consumer i of type h's use of good k' of type j' is denoted Xiiklhi, while firm k
of type j's use of this good is denoted Xjfkljk. Both consumers and firms face the
same price for this good, pip. We let nichi denote money holdings by consumer i of
type h and rnfik denote money holdings by firm k of type j. CI denotes the initial
resources held by consumer i of type h. It is equal to money holdings at the end
of the previous period plus consumer i's share of profits from the preceding period
plus lump-sum transfers from the government. qk denotes the initial resources
held by firm k of type j. It is equal to money holdings at the end of the previous
period plus revenue in the previous period minus last periods profits (which are paid
out to the consumers) plus lump-sum transfers from the government. For a more
detailed description of the model, but without the indexation necessitated by the
introduction of labor submarketS, see Andreassen (1995).
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Using the above notation we have that the consumer's budget constraint is
	mi 	 J Mi
— E E(1 —	 + E E
	
PjkX jkhi Mchi,	 (3.1)
	j=1 k=1
	
j=1 k=1
while the firm's constraint is
C7k — int) jk
J-1-11 Nh	 Jp MiE E Whijklhijk E E Pi' lc' X jikijk M f jk-
h=J+1 i=1	 j'=1 k'=1
Ojk
3.2)
For notational convenience we let xhi be a vector of the goods and
 'hi be a vector
of the labor supplied by consumer i of type h, where we have
Xhi = [Xllhi, • • • 7 XiMihi7 X2ihi7 • • • 7 • • • 7 XJMIlhil
= {thin, • • ,lhaM1, 1hi21, • • • , • • • ,lhiJMJ} •
In the same manner we introduce corresponding notation for the vectors for firm k
of type j given by
Xjk = [Xlljk,	 , X jk-1 jk, X jk+1 jk, • • • , X Jpitl. jpjk]
and
lik = [1J+1 15k, • • • , 1.1+1Nj+ 1jk, 1.7+21jk, • • • 7 • • • 7 lj+HNJ+Irik] •
An important assumption in the following is that the virtual prices are log-linear.
This assumption is consistent with consumer hi having the utility function
chi) alit	
Mj
Uhi(rn 	 (richi l Xhi, 'hi) =	 E E aLik (lhiik 1)14-2 1 i
j=1 k=1
J M3
+ E E C;Ichi(xikhi 1)1—a3jh	 (3.3)
j=1 k=1
and
1
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and firm jk having the production function
Fik(yik, mfik,Xjk,lik, K;k )	 Yik Yjk (Mfik) 1.4311
J-f-H Nh
—E E bLik(lhiik -1- 1)1-02h, k'31c
h=J+1 i=1
JP M.
—E E
F=1 k , =1
= 0,	 (3.4)
where the parameters satisfy
	
aih < 1, aLik > 0,	 0 <	 < 1 ,	 *hijk > 0,
o
 < a2hi,
	
C;khi > 0, 	O < 02hi < 1, C;ik, jk > 0,
< a3jh < 1,	 0 < (33hj < 1,
O < /34j1j < 1,
O < 05ifj < 1.
Both the utility and production function are continuously differentiable, sepa-
rable, and strictly concave. The assumption of separability implies that spillovers
only occur through the budget constraint. The above production function implies
non-increasing returns to scale in mfik, Xjk, and ljk. If we assume that 02ij > 1
and 04ii /35ii > 1 there will be non- increasing returns to scale in all the variables
mfik , Xik, lik, and IfIk . It should be noted that the concavity of the utility function
implies that the consumer prefers to work in a variety of firms rather than working
in only one firm.
Notice that the a and 13 parameters are assumed to only vary between different
types of consumers and firms, while the a, b, and c parameters are assumed to vary
over all individuals and firms.
The above functional forms give a structural interpretation to the log-linear
virtual prices which will be used in the following. Consumers maximize utility while
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hi = 11
auhi (rnCSchi ,
	 , *hi)/aXjkhi 
jfichi(Xxsic-jhi ,M:hi) ==log e, 811h1 (M*Chi	 , )
= Cikhi a ih log Mc*hi — a3jh log (x;khi + 1),
the firms maximize profits. As shown in Andreassen (1995) this behavior can be
described through the use of virtual (shadow) prices and wages. Let elhijk be the
consumer hi's virtual wage for labor supplied to firm jk, qkhi the virtual price for the
good supplied by firm jk, and Gna the virtual price for money (which as numeraire
is always equal to 1). We define similar virtual prices for the firm. Let i4 be firm
jk's virtual wage for labor supplied to firm jk from consumer hi, 7ipeik the virtual
price for the good j'k', ra the virtual price for money, and r/.7,c the virtual price for
the good produced by firm jk.
The virtual prices give us inverse demand and supply functions which depend
on observed transactions. They give the prices at which the observed transactions
would have been purchased if there had been no rationing. We let the variables mc*hi ,
m*fjk, X;khi, X;fkrhi, and y;k denote the transacted quantity of money, labor, and
goods. As noted earlier, these transacted quantities will be the same as the Drèze
demands2 .
From (3.3) and (3.4 it follows that
log ehijk (ricajk , nic*hi) =	
auhi(mcschi,4i ,rchi )/anichi
auhi(rnc*hi,	 ,17,i) aihijk 
= ahijk ay, log m*chi a2hj log (qijk + 1),	 (3.5)
(3.6)
(3.7)
log rilijk 	K7k)
aFik(Y;coMschk,X;01;k, Igk )/amfik
= bhijk Oli log Insf`jk
 — 
g2hi log (lh*iik + 1) + f33 log l<17k ,
2This notation is slightly different from Andreassen (1995).
aFik (Y.4, Treliik , 3eik , 1jk, iqkvaihijk
(3.8)
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log 117,eik(X;1eik,7717fik, ifjk)
OFik(Dr7k7M7X;0k, Ki%)/aMfik
Cj•kijk (31.; log Tref`jk —	 log (X;feik + 1) + Nik log Igk ,
log qk
 (m*fik)
aFikwk ,m7fik ,X.70 1;k , KA)/ aYjk 
aFik(k4, ref Jo X;Ifk rik K.4)/aMfik
=
 dk
 01.jlogrn*Lik,
	 (3.10)
and
	= 1, 	 (3.11)
where we have the following relationship between the parameters in the virtual price
functions and those in the utility and production functions,
ahijk 
= log
 (azi
 ik
	 a2hi 
- aih
g2ki)
bhijk
	
log Kijk 1 — Pih
	Cjikijk
	
log Chijk 
	 Olj
1 — Ct3jh
	
Cjkhi
	
log (cLik
	
- alh
when j
when h=J+1,...,J+H
The parameter
 dk in equation (3.10) is equal to one plus the Lagrange multiplier
pertaining to the firm's budget constraint.
In the case of non-rationed goods the virtual prices will be equal to the observed
prices. For a discussion of virtual prices see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) pp.
109-114. A more detailed discussion of the use of virtual prices in econometric
disequilibrium models can be found in Lee (1986).
The assumption that the min condition must apply in all micro markets leads
to there being two situations which can occur in each micro labor market when
thijk > O (no corner solution). For labor in micro market hijk we have either
aFik(y;k,M*fik, X;ic 1.;'fk K;k ) I Ox
3.9)
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1. ehijk = (1 — t	 hijk and
 7kk > wii : The producer is rationed;
Or
2 Clhijk
 < (1 — tii)whijk and 77 1hijk = wii : The consumer is rationed.
The situation where there is equilibrium will in the following approach have a prob-
ability of measure zero and is therefore trivially included in case 1 above. A corner
solution in a micro labor market will imply that either elhijk
 > (1 — tii)whijk or
rj ihijk Wii (or both).
In the micro markets for private goods we have assumed that the demanders are
never rationed. Assuming an interior solution for the demand of all agents in the
micro market for private good j'k' , this implies:
3 ePlehi Pi'k' for all h and i, rip kijk = PA , for all j and k, and exp( — di3Orgqc, <
(1 — The producer may be rationed.
The term (exp(—di,k,)) enters the above expression because the firm is constrained
by it's budget. As long as a private firm's budget constraint is binding we have that
reki (m*fik,x k ,1;k) > (1 — t2i)pjk. This reflects the fact that our requirement that
purchases of inputs be based on last years sales imposes an inefficiency on the firm.
In the case of government goods recall that we assume that only consumers
demand these and that they are always rationed in their demand. This implies that
for government good jk we always have:
4
 khi < pik for all h and i and exp( — dik)rek = (1 — t2i)Pik: The producer is
never rationed.
When we allow for corner solutions the above becomes more complicated, as dis-
cussed in Andreassen (1995).
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4 The distribution of unobserved heterogeneity
In this section we decompose each of the parameters from the virtual price functions,
the demand for money holdings, the capital stock, the prices and the wages into an
aggregate structural component and a stochastic component. These distributional
assumptions form the basis for the aggregation procedure discussed in the next
section.
To derive aggregate expressions for the different labor submarkets, we must make
assumptions about the distributions of the parameters, ahijk across individuals and,
bhijk, across firms. Aggregation in the goods -markets is based on similar assumptions
about the parameters Cjkhi and Cjikijk. We assume that these parameters can be
decomposed into a structural component and a stochastic component,
ahijk =-' ahi + U2hijk,	 (4.1)
bhijk =-- bh
	V2hijkl (4.2)
Cjkhi --jh , U3jkhi 7= 7! -I-	 when h=J-1-1,...,J+H ,	 (4.3)
cjiwik = Ej ,j + V3jfki jk,	 when j = 1, .. ., J 7 	(4.4)
where the stochastic variable U3jkhi varies across all individuals of type h,
varies across all firms of type j, and IL2hjik and V2hjik vary within the combination of
consumers of type h and firms of type j. These stochastic variables are assumed to
be homoscedastic and serially independent. They may however be correlated with
each other. This decomposition is related to the structural parameters of the utility
and production functions as follows,
1 — alh,
exp(ähi) • exp(u2hijk = d*hi • exP 2hijk) 7 	 (4.5)
+ a2hj
1 — Plh
bschijk 	exp(bhj) 	 • exp(v2hijk)
	
674 • exp(v2hijk) 7 	 (4.6)1 f32hj- 
1 —
C jjk   exp(Eih) • eXP(U3jkhi)
	
= E;h, • exp(u3jkhi) 7 	(4.7)
a3hj
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1 - j
rkfjk	 /31  • exp(Ej,j ) • exp(v3iivik) =
	 exP(vviejk) 7 	 (4.8)
— /34pi
where 4j ,	 Z;h, and Eliv
 are the structural components of the parameters in the
utility and production functions (this notation will be used later in the paper). We
see that the restrictions which apply to the parameters in the utility and production
functions need not apply to these derived parameters
We assume that the realized demand for money holdings at a given time also can
be decomposed into a structural component and a stochastic component, where the
stochastic component describes the distribution of money demand over the popula-
tion of individuals and firms. From the equations for the agents budget constraints
(3.1) and (3.2) we have that money demand is given by
Mj	 jM1
mh
	E (1 -	 - E E pike;khi c(L7	 (4.9)
j=1 k=1
	
j=1 k=1
and
J+II Nh
E E
h=.1+1 i=1
Whijklh*
 ijk
Jp
E E	 C.7k — invjk. 4.10)
j'=1 le =1
j i le$jk
It is assumed that the logarithm of money demand can be written as
and
log
 mh	 flch Ulhi,
log
 mk = fhb Vljk•
In empirical work we must be able to observe the variables fitch and Iflfj . In addition
we must take into account that they will be correlated with the observed aggregate
supply and demand variables. We therefore assume that the variables filch and rrifi
are determined by the reduced form functions gch and gfj in the following manner:
fhch = gch {log (Eki(eickhi)) 7 • • • 7 log (Eki(4-kh1 )), log (Eki(qiik)) • • •
log (Eki(qi jk )), log (Ek(pvc)), • • • log (Ek (PA)),
log (Eki (whak)), - , log (Eki(whak)), log (Ei(CL))}
	 (4.13)
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and
mj = gh {log (Ewk(eveik)) , • • • 7 log (Elek (eijkijk )), log (Eki(13+1ijk))7
log (Eki(G÷Hijk)), log (Ek (Pik)), • • • log (Ek(m)), log (Eki(w./44 iik)),
• - , log (Eki(w.7-Ffiiik)), log (Ek (C.4 -- invik))}
	
(4.14)
where Eki denotes the expectation operator over all variables bearing the subscript
i and k, and ulhi and Vijk are random variables independently distributed of each
other such that filch = log (Ei (rn hi)) and filch = log (Ei (refik)). It is important
to note that we assume that the reduced form equations only depend on aggregate
variables. When we later estimate the aggregate relationships we have derived, these
variables can be viewed as being instrument variables for money demand. All the
aggregate variables are assumed to have the form log(E(x)) instead of E(log(x)).
This greatly simplifies the use of aggregate data because averages of variables are
more readily available than averages of the logarithm of these variables3 . Because
money holdings and labor are jointly determined, u ihi and yip, will not be indepen-
dently distributed of the other stochastic variables. This decomposition of money
demand into an aggregate and a disaggregate stochastic component has implications
for the specification of spillovers in the model. Because of the assumption that the
utility and production functions are separable, spillovers from one market to another
occur only through the budget constraint and thereby through the money demand
variable in the virtual prices.
The distribution of capital Kik across firms of type j is also decomposed into a
structural and a stochastic component,
log
 ('rk) = kj V4ik,
where ki = log (Ek (K;k )) and v4jk is a random variable.
'The expected log of a variable will not be the same as the log of the expected value of this
variable. If for example the stochastic variable x is normally distributed then E (log x) = log (E x)
var (log x).
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Using the above specifications of unobserved heterogeneity we can now write
equations (3.5) to (3.11) as:
log di jk(ti: jk, Mca chi)	 (Ihj alh
	
a2hj log Waik -F 1)
	+U2hijk
	 (4.15)
loa t. 	( X
. --*kjhi 7 ni*Chi)	 'ëjh	 alh Ch	 a3jh log jkh	 1)z 
-Fu3ikhi au, • %Ilia, (4.16)
log ri lhijk (rjajk , 77e. crik., K7k) =-- bh + (31j fhj — 132hj log nik -1- 1) + #3hi
d-V2hijk Plj • Vljk	 0311,j ' V4ik,	 (4.17)
log 717;kfjk(X:;fkljk,771 4cfik, K (j)k) = Ejtj	 ß'j fit f j — Alifi log (x.7,k ,ik d- 1) -F 	Ki
41,3j ,kijk Olj • Vljk	 /35jlj • V4jk,	 (4.18)
and
lOgIgk(nefik) = dik fit fej V5jk + /31j • Vljk. (4.19)
The virtual price functions given by equations (4.15) to (4.19) give a description
of the behavior of the agents as functions of money demand (pseudo-demand) even
under rationing or when they choose corner solutions. We now wish to use these to
describe desired supply and demand in each micro market in the case of an interior
solution. Aggregation will be based on the relationships derived in this manner, also
when taking into account corner solutions. Recall that such supply and demand can
be represented by Glower supply and demand. The variables ifijk and /Eik were
defined earlier as the Glower supply and demand for labor. The Clower demand for
goods is similarly denoted eikhi and X.14 jk for individuals and firms respectively.
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Since the Glower demands and supplies assume that an agent is not rationed
in the market under consideration, we can set the corresponding virtual wages and
prices equal to the actual wages and prices. Let the distribution of the exogenous
wage in the submarket consisting of consumers of type h and firms of type j be
described by
log Whjik = log tphi (4.20)
where log föhj Eik (log tvk) and tthiik is a random variable with a cumulative
distribution function which will specified later. In the same manner the prices of
goods from firms of type
 i are described by
log Rik = log tesik , (4.21)
where log = log (Ek (Pik)) and teik is a random variable zero mean. Note that we
choose a slightly different specification for wages than for prices. In equation (4.20)
we utilize Eik (log whjik) while in equation (4.21) we utilize log (Ek (pik)). These
assumptions are entirely practical, reflecting our needs later.
Assuming that Glower demands and supplies apply in each market and that there
are no corner solutions, we can substitute the above wage and price equations in the
virtual price functions (4.15) to (4.18) to get
log	 +
—khi tthijk
1 
[log — tih)tphj) — hj aih fAch U2hiik
a2hi
—alj • Uihi Phijki /Chi Phijk
=	 Elhijk
	 (4.22) 
1  
log (z hi + 1) = [—log pi 
- ëjh a1h filch U3jkhi aih lhi
a3jh  
= D7h — E4jkhi	 4.23)
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Elhijk = kkhj	 Elhijk —
a2hj
1
(212hijk
a2hj
E2hijk	 (Khj
\
—	
1tthijk
P2hj
1 f
kV2hijk gliVijk )03jkV4jk
P2hj
E4jkhi
r
a3jh L
U3ikhi alh • uihi P:41
log (i k
 + 1) — Khi • Phijk
1 „[—log thh +
 bh
 + [31.j
	 03hj	 V2hijk
P2hj
+glj ' Vljk 133hj • V4jk Phijki Khj • Phijk
= phi
	E2hijk)
	 (4.24)
log (4k,jk
 + 1) = [—logpj	 Oli infj 05jij	 V3j1k• jk
134j 1j
+01j • Vljk 05fj • V4j.
 k 1k]
= D7fi
 — e4jilejk
where
1 [log ((1 tih)fv
- hi) — hi — alh filch] ,
a2hj
g2hj 
[—log tbhi
	 + (31j fhfj (33hj kj]
a3jh 
[—log p-i
 + Eih alh ?kid
—log pi
	+glifilfi 135P.i
[
64j•kijk
	
V3jfkijk
	 Olj • Vljk
	 105j'i • V4jk
g4j 1j
(4.25)
(4.26)
(4.27)
(4.28)
(4.29)
(4.30)
, 	 (4.31)
(4.32)
(4.33)
Dlhj
D.7h
Dæi ii
where Khi is a parameter. The term Khi • phijk has been subtracted from both sides
of the labor market equations (4.22) and (4.24) for reasons which will be explained
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below. For notational simplicity we introduce a third variable defined by
E3hijk Khjtthijk (4.34)
One should note that there is no equation for the supply of goods. This is because
this is given from the production function when all the inputs have been determined.
In the case on an interior solution, we must either have that the Clower demand or
Glower supply is realized (because of the min condition). In the aggregation method
discussed in the following we will utilize this property.
In the following we will make assumptions about the joint distribution of the
stochastic variables Eihijk, E2hijk, and e3hijk. The aggregation results we get on the
basis of these distributional assumptions enable us to estimate the unknown param-
eters. However we are not able to identify the parameters in the distributions of the
underlying stochastic variables, ti2jk and vzik. It is straight forward to derive the
wage distribution given by yhijk from the distribution of E3hijk since equation (4.34)
must apply. From equation (4.30) and the fact that we know the distribution of
thijk and Yhijk, we see that in principle one can find (either analytically or through
simulation) the distribution of the sum U2hijk aijulhi but not the individual dis-
tributions of U2hijk and u ihi . To do this would require additional assumptions about
these distributions. The same applies to the sum V2hijk /31jV1jk 03jkV4jk in equa-
tion (4.31). This means that the micro relations are not fully recoverable from the
aggregate model.
We assume that the the stochastic variables eihijk, E2hijk, and E3hijk are jointly
distributed according to a particular version of the generalized extreme value (GEV)
distribution F (cf. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985)) given below
log F = (e—elhijklelkiThj e—e2hijklehjThj)Thi —63hijk /Oki (4.35)
where Th .; > 0 and Ohj > 0 are parameters. The GEV class implies var E ihijk =
var E2hijk = var E3hijk- The particular specification above implies that the stochastic
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variables sihijk and E2hijk are independent of E3hijk• Even though these assumptions
give us a fairly restrictive specification of the relationship between Eihijkl E2hijk, and
E3hijk, they do not necessarily imply severe restrictions on how the u-s, v-s and Phjik
are related to each other. This can be seen if we calculate var Elhijkl var 62hijk, and
var E3hijk• For example, we can use equation (4.30) to calculate
1
varElhijk	 (Khi	 ) Var MOO 	 ( var U2hijk (a1J) 2 var uihi)
a2hj	 (a2hj)2
alj 
COV (Uihi l
 U2hijk) + aii (Khi -F —) coy (Phijk Uihi)(a20 2 	- 	 a2hj	 a2hj
-Fz	 -F —) coy
 (tthijk, U2hiik)-
	
(4.36)
a2hi	 a2hi
Note that the expected values of the E-S are not necessarily equal to zero. The
interpretation of Thi is as 1 —	 corr (E‘ -lhijk7 E2hijk). The parameter /chi is im-
portant because it gives a more flexible relationship between the variances of the
extreme value distributed random variables Eihijk, E2hijk, and 63hijk and the variance
of wages Whijk. Since E3hijk is extreme value distributed we have that var E3hijk
14j • var(log whijk) = (1/6)7r 2OL implying that Ohj/Khi = 7r \/6 var(log whijk)•
A more detailed discussion of the GEV distribution is given in appendix A.
The generalized extreme value distribution is assumed mainly for analytical con-
venience, but it can be motivated as being a natural way of describing the distribu-
tion of parameters and wages when they are the indirect result of earlier decisions
concerning choice of education and choice of production technology. As an example
consider the choice of education. Let Ei (a) be the utility of working (or a parame-
ter determining the utility of working) given type of education a among A possible
choices for consumer i. The value of E i (a) is known to the consumer, but is unobserv-
able to the econometrician, who views it as being stochastically distributed across
the population of consumers. The resulting indirect utility of working as a function
of chosen education will then be e7 = max(Ei(1), - - , e•(A)). The distribution of
e7 will under certain regularity conditions be extreme value distributed across the
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population. It can be argued that this type of argument also applies to the firm's
choice of capital.
5 Aggregation and estimation
Aggregation across labor submarket hj is based on the Glower demands and supplies
in equations (4.22) and (4.24). These equations can be viewed as quasi-demand
(supply) functions under the condition that there is no rationing and no corner
solutions. They relate the endogenous demand (supply) for labor to the endogenous
demand for money under such conditions. The simple structure of these equations
is a consequence of our assumption of separability, implying that it is only through
the money demand variables (determined by the budget constraint) that spillovers
are transmitted from one market to another. The Clower demands and supplies
together with the min condition and the distributional assumptions made earlier
lead to fairly simple aggregate labor market relationships which can be estimated
using ordinary least squares. In the following we also discuss similar estimation in
the goods market.
5.1 Aggregate labor market relationships
We consider aggregation across the micro markets which make up the submarket
consisting of consumers of type h and firms of type j. Since we concentrate on one
such submarket we drop the subscripts h and j in the following. We retain the micro
subscripts i denoting the individual and k denoting the firm. Since we at present
are only concerned with the labor market we also let D = D and S =
If transactions are positive and qk < 11 then the consumer isn't rationed and
we have that elk = Wik and qk = 1. If lf > 1 1, then we have that TIL =-7 (1 - tl)Wik
and 1g = rick . Our assumption of the economy being in a Drèze equilibrium therefore
implies, as discussed in section 2, that as long as we have an interior solution, 17k > 0,
the following min condition applies
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log (17k -I- 1) = min (log (ifk -I- 1), log (l d- 1)) .	 (5.1)
The min condition links the transacted quantity to the latent supplies and demands.
Together with equations (4.22) and (4.24) it describes the outcome in a situation
with rationing and no corner solution. We now wish to derive the probabilities
discussed in section 2 assuming that the model and functional forms discussed in
section 3 and the distributional assumptions in section 4 apply. The details of
how the different probabilities are derived are however deferred to appendix A. An
important concept is the probability distribution of the number of hours worked by
worker i in firm j, given that the worker is employed by firm k,
P(qk > š I rick > 0) = P(log (rick -F 1) > log (i d- 1) I log (17k -F 1) > . 5.2)
For notational simplicity we denote z = log Cš +1). Substituting from equation 5.1)
for log (1: k` d- 1) in (5.2) we get
P(Vik > I	 > 0)
= P (min (log (lfk d- 1), log ek 	> z I min (log (qk d- 1), log (lig
= P (max (—log (Ifk
 + 1), —log ek d- 1)) < —z I max (—log (qk d- 1),
—log (1
 d- 1)) <	 .	 (5.3)
We now introduce the parameter cf. equation (4.34)) into this equation giving us
P(17k > "i" I 17k
 > 0) =
30
> 0) = P(Pik > 0) e-zi° (e-s/97 e—DierP(1 >
1	 e-zie
P max (—log ( 1rk +1 )
 + Kpik, —log (1 pk + 1) + Ktlik) < kttik — z
I max (—log (if
 4- 1) + pik , —log (1 pi; + 1) + Kpik) Ktlik)	 5.4)
where /Lik is the stochastic variable introduced earlier to describe the distribution
of wages in submarket hj. As mentioned earlier, the introduction of K gives us an
extra degree of freedom, leading to a more flexible modeling of the variances in our
model.
Substituting from the Clower supply and demand equations (4.22) and (4.24)
into the expression for the probability distribution (5.4) using the above notation
we get
> I	 > 0)
= P(max(E i — 5,62 — D) < 63 — z I max(e i — S,62 — D) < E3
P(61 — S < 63— z, E2 — D < E3 — Z)
P(6 1 — S <
 63, E2 	< E3)
(5.5)
Under the distributional assumptions made in section 4 we find that the probability
distribution in equation (5.5) becomes
1	 s-log (5.6)
PUrk >
	
-log (+i)/9  ( e-sor + -DOT
where
1 
13 ( 17k > 0)(5.7)1 + (e-s/er e-Dierr •
We see that the probabilities have a logistic distribution. Equation (5.7) is the
probability of consumer i working in firm k. These assumption imply that the
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probability that the Clower supply l and the Clower demand /Pk are positive will
be
P (1L > 0) = P(e i. - S < 63 )
1 + e-s19 	 (5.8)
and
P(Pigk > 13) = P(e 2
 - D < 63 )
-	 1
I -I- e-Dle • (5.9)
In section 2 we found the that equations (2.9), (2.14), and (2.15) were the empir-
ical counterparts to the theoretical equations (5.7), (5.8), and (5.9). Substituting
equation (2.14) into equation (5.8) and solving for S gives us
S = 6 {log (P(/fk
 > 0)) - log (1 - F. ( 1,7k > 0 ))}
0 liog (1 (1
	 N(2 -1- u)
	/ 	 M \1 log (1 (2 (1)1 (5.10)
and substituting equation (2.15) into equation (5.9) and solving for D gives us
= O {log (13 (/Pi: > 0)) - log (1 -	 > CO)}
= 19 flog ( 
 MN	 j: log (1 - C4))
-log (1 	-I- -m-1 log (1 - -9g))}	 (5.11)
where M is the number of potential firms and V is the number of vacancies of type
as defined in section 2. We also defined N as the number of individuals, Q the
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log r 5.15)
number of employed, and U the number of unemployed among individuals of type
h.
In appendix A we also derive an expression for the expected number of hours
worked by a consumer at a firm given that the consumer has a job there, E(17k I
/71, > 0). This yields
—19 E(q
	 log 
— P (17./ > O)].k I qk > 0) = pyri
 > 0) (5.12)
We assume that the empirical counterpart to E(Pil I 1 > 0) is the average number
of hours worked in each filled job which we denote L. When there are many micro
labor markets, P(rij > 0) will be very small and, as noted in section 2, 1) (17i >
0)/log [1 — > OA will be very close to one. Assuming that it is equal to one and
rearranging equation (5.12) gives us
P (17i	
=
> 0)e 	 L.	 (5.13)
log [1 — P(/7i > 
We thereby have that the parameter 0 is simply equal to the average number of
hours worked. An interesting implication of this is that the variances of the e-s will
vary over time in proportion to L2 . The mean wage across consumers and firms is
found in appendix A to be
W = E(wik
 J 17k > 0) =	 (P(qk > 0)) -9/ (1 —	 (5.14)
where F denotes the gamma function4 . The empirical counterpart to E(wik
 I l > 0)
is assumed to be the average wage in each job held by an employed person and is
denoted W. It is important to note that W is different from the mean wage Cv
covering all potential wage offers. Taking the logarithm of (5.14), substituting in
for P(/7k > 0) from equation (2.9), and rearranging gives us
1
log TT) = log W — log (- 74— log(1 — N
4The gamma function is defined by the integral I'm = fo- ut- le-udu for all t > O.
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We see that the parameter K is important in determining how much the expected
wage over all potential jobs differs from the expected wage in those jobs that actually
are filled. In the estimation procedure discussed later we will wish to calculate ti)
directly using equation (5.15). To do this we need observations of ic from cross-
sectional data. In appendix A we show that if we have observations of E (qk I l >
0) and var (W k I /7k > 0), then we can get K from the non-linear equation:
E (Id	 > 0) 1 var
 (W k I
 Pick > 0) =
r
 (1 — „)
(1 —
(5.16)
The parameters O and lc together determine the variances of the generalized extreme
value distribution which we have used. The aggregation procedure presented above
therefore entails the need to know the variance of wages. The simple distributional
assumptions made enable us to derive both the distribution of the virtual demand
wage and the virtual supply wage on the basis of this.
5.2 Identification and estimation
The parameters in the model can now be estimated using the aggregate relationships
we found in the preceding section. Introducing the subscripts h, j, and t denoting
consumer type, firm type and time period respectively, we have that the following
set of equations allows us to identify the structural parameters concerning labor
submarket hj,
sut =	 (5.17)
bhj , 131i _	 133hi	 , _a
- -----logl  fvhit
	1'	 n't fit -r o 	njt -t- v2hit,
	
(5.18)
/3
 2 hi	 P2hj	 P 2 hi	 P2hi
a2hi
1
log ((1 — tiht)Cohit) — ahj 	aih 	 , _arncht	 ulhit,
a2hi a2hi
D iho
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where
hjt -— Lhjt log
Chjt Uhjt 
Nht
mjt
1 log (1	 ho UhQ	 -3 t 
Mjt	 Nht
(5.19)
jt 	1	 ° \\
ur
 log 
— f))
-t
Lhjt {log ( 
Vh
mitivht
Vhjt
	1—log (1 
injt ,ht	
lo (1 —g	 Nhthit ))1(  .20)
log
 Whit = log Whit -I-
Lhjt
 log (_ L log(1	 ,(2 h-i. t )) — log	 Lh-t(1 -	 (5.21)
Kkit	 Mjt	 v ht	 Khjt
and
F (1 - 2Lh,,)
kh,, 
Lh tr (1 -
ithit
1+
Eik (Wkt
 I qiikt > 0)
Var k W hij kt I	 > O) ' (5.22)
Variations over time in the relationships (5.17) and (5.18) are specified by adding the
stochastic variables thhit and '02hit which take into account variation in the relation-
ships over time. They are assumed to have white noise properties. These equations
have a linear form making them easy to estimate using OLS. From equations (5.19)
to (5.22) we see that we can indirectly observe the theoretical variables Skit , D ihit ,
and ibhit in addition to variables fitcht = log (E (mchit)), filfit = log (E (mfikt)), and
kit = log (E (K;kt )).
A problem with using OLS directly on equations (5.17) and (5.18) is that the
money variables fhcht and fitfjt are correlated with the demand and supply variables
Siki and Diki because money demand and labor supply or demand are assumed to
be chosen simultaneously at the micro level. To get around this problem we use the
money demand functions introduced earlier as instrumental variables in estimating
the above equations. These demand functions can formally be approximated by
fn. cht = gc*h flog (Eki (el ichit)), • • • , log (Eki(4-khit )), log (Eki(rivilkt))) • •
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• • •log (Eki(/ jkt )), log (Ek (pikt)),
	
7 log (Ek(Alkt))
log (Eki(whakt)), • - • 'log (Eki(whukt)), log (Ei(Ci ))1 5.23)
and
fhfit -= 91i {log (Ekik (XTIciikt) )7 • • 7 log (Ekik(X*Jkijkt))7	 (Eki(G-F1 ijkt))7 • • • 7
log (Ek(Pinct)), 1 (E
	
_og
	 (tV J-1-1 iikt)) 7log (Eki(G+H kt)) 7 log ( -Ek (pikt,))	 7
• • • log (Eki(tv.i+Hiikt)), log (Ek (C7kt — invikt))}	 '04hjt,	 (5.24)
where the random variables 1,3hit and 19 4hit are independently distributed of each
other and of the stochastic variables 191hi t , and t92hjt. The reduced form functions
g:h and g;i will in practical applications be specified as a polynomial in a subset
of the exogenous variables in the model. Since the variables in these functions are
only meant as instruments in estimating equations (5.17) and (5.18) misspecification
of these functions need not seriously impair the estimates as long as the included
variables are highly correlated with the money variables. Even in the case of mis-
specification, we get consistent estimates of the parameters in equation (5.17) and
(5.18). One should note that the money variables rricht and filfit are most likely
to be correlated with the wage variable log Cuhit , which can give multicollinearity
problems (though the dependency is probably non-linear).
It is apparent that the parameters ct 1 h, a2hi, ahj, pli, 02hi 133hj, and Liki are
all identifiable from OLS estimation (when the OLS-estimates are consistent) on
equations (5.17) and (5.18). Using equations (5.17), (5.18), (5.23), and (5.24) to
estimate the parameters in one labor submarket leads to unique estimates. If we
expand the system to include two or more labor submarkets, which have either h
or j in common, the estimates of the money demand parameters a2h and [33.i will
be overidentified. This is because the money demand function ?km enters all labor
submarket relationships which include labor of type
 i and filfjt enters all labor
submarket relationships including firms of type j. This implies that one should
use simultaneous equation estimation techniques such as maximum-likelihood when
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estimating the relationships in more than one labor submarket. The same situation
arises when estimating the labor market together with the goods market.
It is possible to calculate the parameters
and
	_ 	
— ava.
	u, h -	 exp(eihi)1 -1- a2hi (5.25)
1 — /31/1. 	,-;-
-6L	 exP(b i)-	 (5.26)
— 132hj
but not the distribution of the original parameters aLik and qiik . If we normalize
such that E (exp(u2hijk)) = 0 and E (exp(v2hijk)) = 0 then we have that E
 (ak) =
eili
 and E
 (Kik) = kJ. It should be noted that this implies that E (u2hijk) and
E (v2hijk) will not be equal to O.
5.3 Disequilibrium indicators
The observed variables for unemployment U and vacancies V are indicators of dis-
equilibrium in the labor market, but do not give a complete picture of the extent
of mismatch or rationing. They are exclusively concerned with work/do not work
and hire/do not hire situations. Rationing leads to many other types of mismatch.
The individual observes that there are other jobs open to individuals with his or her
characteristics which are more desirable given the going wage. In the same manner
the firm observes individuals which are preferable to those it hires given the going
wage. Another shortcoming of the variables U and V is that they do not reflect the
latent nature of many jobs. There are many potential jobs in an economy which
are never done because the potential wage is too small. The aggregation approach
discussed above leads to a greater number of indicators which can be used to char-
acterize how disequilibrium changes over time in an economy. In the following we
drop the subscript t denoting time period.
An indicator which is closely related to the observed variables for unemployment
and vacancies, but which covers all latent micro markets, is the difference between
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the probability that a firm wishes to hire a person and the probability that this
person wishes to work there. Weighted by the number of micro markets in submarket
hj this difference can be written
mi Nh (pgijk
 > _ p(lhDijk > 0)) (5.27)
giving the number of micro labor markets in which individuals wish to work minus
the number of micro markets in which the firms wish to hire. This indicator is only
concerned with whether a individual wishes to work or a firm wishes to hire and does
not take into account how demand and supply interact (the correlation between the
individual's desire to work at a firm and this firm's desire to hire the individual).
An alternative indicator which gives a more complete picture of the extent of
rationing is a comparison of the virtual wages to the actual wages. Equation (4.15)
can be rewritten to give
1
logehii *k (1 hi jk7 M:hi)	 hi	 )Phijk a2hi
a2hj
=-  Ethi + alh fitch a2hj log (1;:iik + 1) + U2hijk ay& • Ulhi — hj +
a2hi
=-  elk; + al h fitch a2hj log (1;: + 1) — a2hi • eihijk
and equation (4.20) can be represented as
1
Phijk a2hi
(5.28)
log Whjik ghijk a2hj Khj • Phijk	 log fühj a2hi • Khj '	 jk
log (Oki — 2/4 • 63hijk •	 5.29)
Substituting equation (5.29) into (5.28) leads to
log elhiik (1;: ik, M:hi ) — log Whjik
=	 ay, filch + a2hi log (/ ik + 1) — log '0)/4 — ce2hj • (61hijk 63hijk	 5.30)
Taking expectations on both sides of this equation gives us
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E (log (ehijk(lZijklM:hi)))
Whjik
Eihj	 fiich a2hj • P (ilijk > 0) • E (log (qiik d- 1) I P(/ k
Ei hi + aih fhch a2hj • Oki • 100(1k > 0)) — log 'Cvhj
)) — log Cohi
(5.31)
where we have substituted for E (log (i ap, d- 1) I P(/ k > 0)) from equation (A.28)
in appendix A and used the fact that the expected value of eihijk and 63hijk are
equal. In the same manner we can find from equation (4.17) that
E (log ( )Iiihijk (1hijk, rn ,*fjk, KA) 
Whjik
5.32)
bh.; + 131.; ihjj 132hj • Oki • log(P > 0)) — log tbhj•
Using the parameter estimates and observations of Oki and P(Vhciik > 0)) discussed
above the price ratios in equations (5.31) and (5.32) can be calculated. An increase
in the absolute value of these ratios will indicate increased rationing in the labor
submarket under study. They capture the total effects of rationing on each side
of the market, but do not consider the simultaneous distribution of demand and
supply.
A third indicator is the probability that supply is larger than demand in a par-
ticular labor market when supply is greater than zero, P(1fiik > PeijkAik > 0).
This indicator reflects only the number of hours which individuals wish to sup-
ply and firms wish to employ. It does not take the working/not working or the
hiring/not hiring decision into account, but looks at supply and demand simultane-
ously in each micro labor market. In this manner it supplements the two indicators
suggested above. In appendix A this probability was found to be
P ( 1 Zi ik >	 trai k > 0)	 P (1 47: k > 0) — (1 — P (111 -3 k rDh,ijk > 0),(5.33)
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where
p(ig, > 1g)
	
(5.34)1 -I- (exp(Dhj — Shi ) 1 /(ohiThJ)) •
The rationing constraints are related to the prices and wages in the economy.
We have not modeled such relationships, but the above aggregation approach does
give some indication how wages affect many important variables. It can therefore be
interesting in a given situation to see how the above indicators change if the wage
distribution changes. This can be done by simulating these indicators' response to
a small change in /chi, implying a shift in the expectation and variance of the wage
distribution. Such a change will alter both the expectation and the variance of the
wage distribution. It is important to note that all the relationships dicussed above
are conditional on the set of observed variables and that we do not know which
behavioral changes a change in a parameter will lead to. Any changes which occur
in the indicators as a result of a change in Khj therefore only says whether such a
change would decrease disequilibrium given the present situation. If this is the case
we can conjecture that it will also decrease disequilibrium after behavioral changes
are taken into account, since it is still possible for the agents to choose the present
situation. But since the degree of disequilibrium may increase in some micro markets
and decrease in others, we can not be sure of how this will influence the aggregate
indicators we have suggested above.
5.4 Aggregation and estimation in the markets for goods
The aggregation method described above could also be used to aggregate the demand
for goods across consumers and firms when there is rationing, but requires the
assumption that each combination of buyer and seller is a separate market. This
seems a more unrealistic assumption in the goods market than in the case of the
labor market, because labor supply and demand are much more heterogenous than
the supply and demand for goods. It is also difficult to find disequilibrium data
for goods of the type we have for the labor market, where we for example have
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observations of unemployment and vacancies. These considerations leads us to only
aggregate in the labor market under rationing and to treat the goods market in
a simplified manner by assuming that demand for private goods is never rationed
while demand for government goods is always rationed.
The assumption that individuals are always rationed in their demand for govern-
ment goods (firms do not demand government goods) implies that it is impossible
to estimate the parameters concerning such goods. Each individual's purchase of
government goods will-be solely determined by the rationing constraints and not by
preferences. In the following we therefore only concern ourselves with the demand
for private goods. We discuss only the demand by individuals in detail since the
same type of relationships will characterize the demand by firms.
We assume that we can observe the average consumption of goods of type j by
individuals of type h, which we denote gjh, and that the theoretical counterpart
to this variable is the expected consumption of good jk by individual hi, E (xkihi).
The stochastic variable e4jkhi was earlier assumed to describe the variation in the
virtual price of goods of type j while teik described the variation in prices. These
random variables are now assumed to be distributed according to 4)
log 41) (64jkhi 7 tqk = exP(-64ikhiNi ) exp( —A;kNih), (5.35)
where 'kJ > 0 is a parameter. This is a special case of the GEV distribution assumed
for the labor market in equation (4.35), and therefore can get similar aggregation
results for the goods market as for the labor market. Doing the same calculations for
the goods markets as was done for the labor markets in appendix A and remembering
that Clower demands equal transactions when there is no rationing and no corner
solutions, we can derive the following relationships:
	P jichi >	 = P(1)7h E4jkhi > 1-14.4)!!
1
1+ exp( — D7h ltkih) ( 5 . 3 6 )
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and
E(X;khi I X; khi > 13) =	 —11)14	 log [1 — P(eikhi > 0)].	 (5.37)
P(x;khi > 0)
These two equations are simplified versions of equations (5.7) and (5.12) which were
found for the labor market. These equations taken together give us
Xjh = P(X;ic > 0) • E (X;khi I X' khi > O)
=	 (1 	
exp(—D.Th Ilkjh) +1)
Solving this equation for Djh leads to
(5.38)
exp(—XihIlkih) D.Th
 = 1 — exp(—Xihltkih))
According to Johnson and Kotz (1970) p. 283, one can estimate
following equation
[	
–1
li)jh 7--- -X- jh — E X jkhi exp(—xikhiNih) Eex13(—xikhiNjh)	 . (5.40)
ik	 ik
It is necessary to solve this equation numerically. From equation (5.37) we see that
if P(*hi > 0) is small then lAkih f'•■1 .gihIP(X .7khi > 0).
The above results imply that the Glower demands can be estimated in the same
manner as in the labor market. Introducing the time subscript t we have that
and
D7ht =
Ejh 	aih,
	log ì3 t
 -F	 -t- - Mcht 19 5jht 7
a3 j h	 a3jh a3jh
(5.41)
fitcht — gch {log (Eki(xIkhit )), • • • , log (E x khit )), log (Eki(tikt)), - 7
log (Eki (/;:i
 At )), log (Ek(Pikt)), • - • 7 log (Ek(P.Ikt)),
log (Eki(whilkt)), - • • 7 log (Eki (Whakt ) ) 7 log (E1(CL))1 -F 93hit, 5.42)
(5.39)
tkih from the
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where equation (5.41) is equation (4.28) with the white noise random variable V5 jht
added. Estimation will now be exactly the same as in the case of the labor market.
Notice that equation (5.41) has the parameter au in common with equation (5.17)
indicating, as mentioned, that the goods and labor markets ought to be estimated
simultaneously.
• 5.5 A comparison with the smoothing by aggregation ap-
proach
The aggregation approach described above is in some ways similar to the smooth-
ing by aggregation approach, first suggested by Muellbauer (1978). Lambert (1988)
derives an aggregate relationship at the macro level which represents an explicit
aggregation of micro markets. Gourieroux (1984) derives similar aggregated rela-
tionships as those in Lambert (1988) using different distributional assumptions. In
the following we drop the subscripts h and j denoting types of individual and firm
and the subsript t denoting time period.
Lambert (1988) starts by modeling micro markets in the same manner as we did
above,
log lfk = As + el,	 (5.43)
log /Pk = AD +62 , 	(5.44)
log /ik = min (log ifk , log O),	 (5.45)
where the A-s are structural relationships (including for example prices). In contrast
to our approach he does not derive the A-s from the individual optimization of the
agents and assumes that the stochastic variables e l and 62 are bivariate normally
distributed. The aggregate transacted quantity Ï is given by:
NM
= EE min (log /isk , log liDk )	 (5.46)
i k
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where N is then number of consumers and M is the number of firms. Lambert shows
that the CES function:
E(I) r".1 NM • [E(l) 	 E(1S)-1 - 1- 	(5.47)
gives a good approximation to equation (5.46) for v > O. The parameter v is the
correlation coefficient in the bivariate normal distribution. He succeeds thereby in
getting a fairly simple expression for aggregate transactions.
The main objective of the smoothing by aggregation approach is to derive a
relationship which permits a gradual (smooth) increase of rationing in an aggregate
market. The above expression is usually used in connection with the two market
neo-Keynesian macro model, permitting some parts of the economy to experience
Keynesian unemployment while other parts experience classical unemployment.
An interesting aspect of the aggregation approach of Lambert (1988) is the im-
portance attached to the weighted probability 13 (a > /ID, which is the probability
that supply is greater than demand when each micro market is weighted by its con-
tribution to aggregate transactions. The same assumptions used to derive the CES
function above lead to this probability being given by
1P ing > 1g)	 (5.48)1 -I- (E(/Pk)/E(a)r
This probability can be compared to the probability P(/ > /Pk) which Is found in
appendix A as being equal to
p(ifk
 > Ig)	
•	
(5.49)(exp(Dhi — Shi ) 1 /(ehiThi)) 
	If we can assume that E(/H, I /7/, > 0)	 D/O and E(qk I /7k > 0)	 SiO then
we can derive an expression for P(l, > /Pk') which is easy to compare to Lambert's
expression for 1)(a > 15 ) in equation (5.48). In appendix A we found that
o 	 (5.50)E(/Pk
	>	
(1 + exp(—D10)\
	rk	 logP (I > exp(—D119)
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and
0 	I E(1fic 	> 0) =
	
log  	 (5.51)P(Pik > 0)  
where D and S are defined as in equations (5.17) and (5.18). Taking the exponent
of these two equations and then dividing them by each other and rearranging gives
us
exp(D/0 — SO) = exp (E(1 I l > 0) — E( ifk I l > 0) 1 + exp(—D/O) 1 + exp(—S/0) 5.52)
Combining this with equation (5.49) gives us
p(IL > lpk ) 1  (5.53) T •
where
LD = exp (E(1f)k I 17k > 0)) exp (E(16, I 17k >	 DIO	 (5.54)
and
Ls = exp (E(11 I 17k > 0))	 4exp (E	 > 0) — 570) .
If one where to assume that D 0 ,f:sd E(lE, I 1 > 0) and 5/0 E(irk I 1a > 0) then
equation (5.53) will become'
p(a >q)k) = 1+ [exp
 (E(lß 1 .21 > 0) _ 	 irk > off
1 -I- [exp(DIO — SO)] 	 (5.55)
From this we see that even though this probability has a functional form close to
that proposed by Lambert (in equation (5.48)), they are different. The probability
5 Even though this is not the case in our model, it is an assumption close to the type we make
in equations (4.22) to (4.25).
1
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derived on the basis of our model has a logistic form and the arguments are condi-
tional on there being no corner solution (l7k > 0). One should note how large a role
the probabilities of there being a positive Irk , lf , and rick play in all the aggregate
variables we find. This indicates how important it is in an approach such as ours to
take explicitly into account the possibility of corner solutions.
The main difference between our approach and the smoothing by aggregation
approach is that we have strived for a more structural approach based on explicit
utility and profit maximization enabling us to characterize disequilibrium in many
submarkets, while the smoothing by aggregation approach is concerned with finding
an equation to describing aggregate transactions when the demand side is rationed in
some micro markets while the supply side is rationed in others. The above illustrates
that it is possible in the aggregation approach discussed in this paper to find the
same type of aggregate probabilities as in the smoothing by aggregation approach.
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6 Data and empirical results
In the following an example is given of empirical use of the aggregation approach
presented above. Estimation results are presented for the case when there is one
type of individual and four types of firms and thereby four labor submarkets. Ag-
gregation is done across all private goods so that there is only one aggregate goods
market. It must be emphasized that the following results are mainly of an illus-
trative nature, since the model is very parsimonious and the quality of the data
are fairly poor, requiring much ad hoc adjustments. Especially the money variables
and the distribution of unemployment and -vacancies across sectors required strong
apriori assumptions. For example, the distribution of vacancies across sectors has
been imputed using fixed coefficients, tending to make the time series for different
sectors follow each other (which is seen in the figures we will discuss later). The
following is still interesting in that it illustrates the extent to which the approach
discussed earlier is relevant and where further research is most needed.
The labor market is, as mentioned, divided into four aggregate submarkets with
one type of individual and the following four types of firms (sectors):
1. A public sector (central and local government);
2. A sector for traded goods except oil and gas;
3. A sector for non-traded goods (except those produced by the public sector
4. A sector for oil and gas production.
In the following we also consider the total aggregate labor market.
Most of the data used are reported for the period 1971 to 1992, but because
of some gaps in the data, the estimation results are based only on data for the
period 1976 to 1991 (16 years). Data from the National Accounts are at core of the
estimation though they are supplemented by other data.
47
L.	 L1	 L2 	L3t 	L1 1?- t klt k2t rf3t 1?4t
1707 1491 1734 1740 2167
1694 1473 1727 1728 2164
1672 1452 1709 1706 2192
1653 1440 1711 1685 2143
1599 1397 1662 1629 2102
1564 1358 1636 1600 1928
1525 1317 1598 1571 1802
1501 1304 1569 1544 1818
1499 1297 1579 1543 1847
1489 1286 1587 1529 1845
1477 1284 1577 1516 1820
1472 1282 1572 1513 1779
1464 1278 1579 1502 1770
1458 1276 1565 1496 1770
1453 1268 1570 1492 1730
1424 1254 1534 1461 1682
1428 1250 1542 1471 1685
1422 1245 1546 1463 1738
1414 1244 1535 1453 1767
1407 1239 1538 1446 1771
1414 1244 1547 1458 1775
4.9 114 3.6 3.2 22.5
5.1 121 3.8 3.4 24.2
5.3 128 4.0 3.5 25.6
5.6 136 4.2 3.7 28.0
6.0 143 4.4 3.8 32.3
6.4 151 • 4.6 4.0 35.5
6.6 160 4.8 4.2 35.7
6.8 168 4.9 4.3 35.0
7.0 176 5.0 4.5 33.6
7.3 183 5.2 4.7 35.0
7.4 190 5.3 4.9 34.7
7.7 196 5.3 5.0 35.4
7.9 203 5.4 5.2 36.8
8.1 209 5.6 5.4 33.7
8.4 216 5.9 5.7 34.0
8.7 224 6.3 5.9 34.2
9.0 233 6.6 6.1 35.2
9.3 241 6.7 6.2 37.1
9.4 249 6.8 6.3 35.8
9.5 258 6.7 6.4 35.3
9.6 267 6.7 6.4 35.4
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
Table 1: Individuals age 16-74, =employment, vacancies, and employment. 1000 
Nt Ut V.t Vit V2t V3t V4t Q . t CI it Q 2t Q 3t Q 4t
1972 2732 28 22.1 2.1 11.0 8.8 0.12 1673 302 339 979 53
1973 2749 26 21.3 2.4 10.1 8.7 0.11 1685 316 341 975 53
1974 2768 25 25.9 2.6 12.8 10.3 0.14 1706 324 350 983 49
1975 2809 33 15.7 1.8 7.4 6.3 0.07 1738 346 352 994 46
1976 2825 33 17.5 2.7 5.9 8.9 0.09 1796 374 350 1027 45
1977 2844 27 22.9 2.9 8.8 11.0 0.11 1843 392 349 1054 48
1978 2866 34 18.1 2.5 7.0 8.5 0.09 1877 415 342 1075 45
1979 2885 38 16.2 3.2 5.1 7.8 0.08 1905 433 338 1089 45
1980 2875 32 20.9 3.7 8.1 9.0 0.10 1947 452 338 1110 47
1981 2909 40 17.0 3.7 6.4 6.7 0.09 1967 471 335 1110 51
1982 2937 52 13.1 3.4 4.6 5.0 0.08 1969 480 324 1114 51
1983 2958 69 8.4 3.3 1.4 3.7 0.06 1963 492 308 1113 50
1984 2979 64 11.1 3.9 2.0 5.2 0.05 1976 497 307 1122 50
1985 3004 54 15.1 5.4 2.9 6.7	 • 0.09 2028 510 309 1161 48
1986 3024 42 27.3 8.8 5.8 12.5 0.15 2089 518 312 1215 44
1987 3046 45 32.3 10.4 5.9 15.8 0.14 2133 536 311 1249 37
1988 3071 70 22.6 9.3 3.1 10.0 0.12 2118 544 297 1239 38
1989 3087 106 18.0 7.0 2.7 8.2 0.10 2069 554 278 1190 47
1990 3094 112 17.1 7.4 2.2 7.5 0.13 2051 567 271 1160 53
1991 3105 116 16.9 7.5 2.3 7.1 0.13 2034 584 261 1134 55
1992 3116 126 16.7 7.8 1.9 6.9 0.14 2029 600 260 1115 54
Table 2: Average hours worked per person and average capital per firm (in millions Mir.).
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The number of individuals considered to be active in the labor market, Nt , is the
total population age 16-74. Unemployment among these individuals, Ut , is obtained
from the Norwegian Labor Force Surveys. It is assumed that each unemployed
wishes to work in all the above sectors.
Time series of vacancies, Vi t , have been derived in a rather ad hoc manner. They
are based on the number of vacant jobs by occupation reported at the employment
offices at the end of the year. We have then made ad hoc assumptions about the
relationship (held constant throughout the period) between occupation and the de-
mand of the above sectors so as to distribute vacancies across these sectors. The
resulting numbers are multiplied by a factor to take into account that not all vacan-
cies are reported to the employment offices and that a given vacancy can represent
a larger number of available jobs.
The average number of man-hours worked in each sector is given by the variable
Qt derived from the National Accounts. Table 1 shows the magnitudes involved
for the variables discussed so far. The average number of hours worked per person,
Lit and the average amount of capital in each firm, kit , are also obtained from the
National Accounts and are illustrated in table 2.
From the Survey of Level of Living 1991 we find that an estimate of E(qk
/7k > 0) is 9.5 and of var(wik
 I l > 0) is 1.8. These figures make it possible to
calculate the relationship Oitinit = 0.5. Lacking data for most of the other years,
it is assumed that this relationship applies to all sectors we are looking at and does
not change over time.
The average nominal wage compensation per hour worked, Wit is found in the
National Accounts and is illustrated in figure 1. Wages generally have followed each
other with the exception of the oil and gas sector. One might also note that public
employees have had a greater growth in wage compensation than those in the sector
producing non-traded goods. The general trend can in part be explained by reduced
working hours.
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T. t
	 71t	 72t	 73t	 74t
0.086
0.083
0.088
0.072
0.073
0.075
0.071
0.067
0.069
0.067
0.067
0.064
0.070
0.069
0.084
0.091
0.091
0.106
0.108
0.112
0.113
0.040
0.037
0.035
0.036
0.036
0.031
0.032
0.035
0.031
0.034
0.040
0.047
0.046
0.042
0.041
0.044
0.055
0.066
0.068
0.068
0.071
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
0.21
0.19
0.20
0.17
0.15
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.15
0.16
0.17
0.20
0.21
0.21
0.27
0.27
0.29
0.28
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.10
0.11
0.10
0.10
0.09
0.09
0.09
0.08
0.09
0.10
0.10
0.11
0.12
0.12
0.14
0.14
0.15
0.16
0.21
0.21
0.23
0.24
0.26
0.22
0.26
0.27
0.26
0.25
0.27
0.31
0.29
0.32
0.35
0.43
0.49
0.46
0.44
0.44
0.47
Table 3: Calculated values of the parameter r
We now have the observations needed to calculate the probabilities discussed
in section 2 and some of the aggregate relationships discussed in section 5. The
parameter T can be calculated, determining the correlation between desired supply
and demand. The results are given in table 3. We find that the correlation between
supply and demand has fallen in the first part of the period we are looking at and
risen in the latter part.
Before proceeding we must make a normalization assumption about the size of
the potential economy as discussed in section 2. This is done by assuming that there
are a total of 240000 potential firms, with 2000 large units in the public sector, 30000
firms producing traded goods, 200000 firms producing non-traded goods and 8000
firms in the oil and gas sector. These are ad hoc assumptions setting the number of
firms one would have if all possible firms were to be active. It is also assumed that
the number of potential firms is constant over the period we are looking at. This
need not imply that the observed number of firms is constant, but in our case we
have that almost all the potential firms are active and therefore that the number of
firms is constant.
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Figure 2. Probability of a match in a
micro market (x 1,000,000), part 1
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The development in the probability of a match in a micro market, P(qiik > 0), is
shown in figures 2 and 3 for the different sectors. This probability is by far greatest
in the public sector due to the few but large units we have assumed there. It is
also the only sector in which this probability is increasing, while for the non-traded
sector it is declining.
Another way of viewing disequilibrium is by using the indicator given by equation
(5.33) in section 5. This gives the estimated probability that supply is greater than
demand in a micro market when supply is positive shown in figures 4 and 5. It
takes into account both situations where there is unemployment or vacancies and
disequilibrium situations where the agents are constrained in the number of hours
worked. In aggregate and for the traded and non-traded goods sectors this indicator
follows the business cycle showing a clear deterioration during the economic slumps
of 1983/84 and during the last six years. The public sector and the oil and gas
sectors do not follow the business cycle as closely. It is interesting to note that the
probability of excess supply in the public sector is increasing at the same time as
there is an increase in the probability of a match as seen in figure 2. This indicates
that the public sector has been attracting well qualified individuals who are relatively
likely to get employment there.
It is important to note that the lines in the figures denoting aggregate data are not
an aggregation of the disaggregate lines. The aggregate line is from a model based
on aggregate time series, while the disaggregate lines are from a different model
based on disaggregate time series. The main difference is that in the first case the
heterogeneity assumptions discussed earlier are made for the whole economy, while
in the second case they are made separately for each production sector.
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Figure 4. Prob. that supply is greater
than demand (x1,000,000), part 1
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The indicator shown in figures 4 and 5 is based on the econometric model we
have discussed earlier. Another indicator, discussed in section 2, is the number
of micro markets with positive supply minus the number with positive demand,
MfiNt [P(/ 1`5,:iik > 0) — P(1/1,34!ik > 0)], shown in figures 6 and 7. These figures basicly
confirm the picture given by the indicator shown in figures 4 and 5, although it is
interesting to note that the two indicators give a different picture of the development
in the public sector (figures 4 and 6).
From the observed -wages given in figure 1 we can calculate the theoretical wage
variable (bit shown in figures 8 and 9. The public sector behaves differently from the
others. The theoretical wage' is increasing much more rapidly there than in the other
sectors. From figure 1 it is apparent that this is not just a reflection of the increase
in the observed wages, but is also also explained by the econometric model we have
developed. Increased relative wages are needed to draw workers to the public sector
so that increased matching probabilities (figure 2), increasing employment (table 1)
and increasing excess supply (figure 4) will be consistent with each other. From
figure 8 it is apparent that the non-traded goods sector has grown less attractive
over the period we are looking at.
Figure 8. The theoretical wage
variable w, part 1
Figure 9. The theoretical wage
variable w, part 2
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We now consider estimation based on the model presented in the preceding parts
of the paper. The equations we wish to estimate are given by
sit =	 -log ((1 — tt )tbit ) —	 m at +	ai 	 al
a23
	az; a22
jt 	—	 log fv-it
	+ 0
 mfit
 -t- ----0
 /kit "T" 2jt
P2:1	 P2j P2j	 p2j
• for the labor markets and
1	 ëc, al	 , .0
—	 fat — —7,6 ct -r u st ,
a3
	a3 a3
Dft
1
= — log 73 t ë fjh t #4j
	 04j
'31
 filfjt	 kjt	 10 5jt,
/34j	 043
for the goods markets, where fit is the consumer price index and fiit is a price
index for the inputs used by firms in sector j. The variables S lit , D ijt and 13; are
calculated using equations (5.19), (5.20), and (5.39). The variable/3:It is derived
in an analogous manner to D. The goods market is treated as a single aggregate
market. As mentioned in section 5, we also specify money demand equations as
functions of variables which function as instrument variables in estimating the above
equations. We choose to specify these by
ma
4
=	 + 72 • log (Ge ) + 3 log (Pt) + E 74j • log ((1 — t
3
+75 • log (E(C)) + Vat,
for the individuals and
fit fit = 76j ey7j kjt 78j • log (3jt) 79j log tb: it)
+710j • log (E(C;kt)) 13it
for the firms, where Gt is the average consumption of public goods. For the consumer
the money variable fit ct mainly reflects the changes in fixed capital formation from
the National Accounts. Even though this is not a normal money concept, it must
be remembered that money represents the whole financial system in our model.
(6.5)
(6.6)
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Table 4: OLS estimation of money demand 1976-1991 (16 observations)
Parameter Estimated Standard t-statistic
error
rnct = + 72 • log (Gt) + 73 - log (p-t) +	 74i • log ((1 - ov)it) 4- -y5 log (E(C)) + 1.93ct
(R2 : 1.00 DW: 1.50)
	
-10.81	 3.80	 -2.84
72
	 0.69
	
0.33
	
2.09
73	 -0.66
	
0.31	 -2.09
741
	 0.46
	
0.22
	
2.10
742	 -0.83
	
0.40	 -2.07
743	 -0.09
	
0.36	 -0.26
744
	 0.27	 0.92
	
3.00
75
	 1.11
	
0.26
	
4.25
761 + 771 • ki.t 7131 • log (pit) + 791 • log (fbit) + 710 i • log (E(q.kt)) 1,31t
(R2 : 1.00 DW: 1.53)
761
771
781
791
710 1
8.21
-0.53
-0.74
0.61
1.10
5.15
0.24
0.14
0.18
0.03
1.60
-2.19
-5.37
3.44
32.3
= 762 + 772 • 1?2t + 782 • log (pit) + 792 • log (020 + 7102 log (E(C3kt)) 1,32t
(R2 : 0.92 DW: 1.22)
	762	 -46.17
	
7.13	 -6.48
	 7
	 1.35	 0.58	 2.32
	782
	 0.53	 0.18	 2.94
	 9 	 -2.52
	 0.29	 -8.69
	710 2
	 2.10	 0.36	 5.88
	itif3t =I-
 763	 ± 773 • :k3t ± 783 • log (P.M	 793 log (17,3t) + 7103 • log (E(C3kt)) +1933t
(R2 : 0.99 DW: 1.50)
	763
	 5.31	 4.00	 1.33
	 7 	 -0.38
	 0.24	 -1.60
	783
	 0.06
	 0.07	 0.82
	 9 	 -0.006
	 0.09	 -0.07
	1103
	 1.03	 0.08	 13.1
	mf 4t = 764	 + 774 * K4t + 784
	
(P4t) + 794 • log (1140 + 7104 • log (E(C:kt)) 1934t
(R2 : 0.99 DW: 2.18)
	764	 24.38	 21.7	 1.13
	 7 	 -1.25	 1.11	 -1.12
	784	 1.56	 0.41	 3.82
	 9 	 0.42	 0.81	 0.52
	7104 	0.84	 0.45	 1.87
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The resources available at the beginning of the period, E(C), are also obtained
from the National Accounts. The money  variable of the firm ihfit is derived in
a similar manner to that of the individual and is based on fixed capital formation
from the National Accounts while taking into account our assumption that the firm's
revenues accrue in the period after production has taken place. To mention all the
minor ad hoc assumptions made in deriving these financial variables would take too
much space, but it is important to note that these variables are not very reliable.
The money variables can be constructed in many different ways based on different
interpretations of what they represent (to what degree they represent "pure" money
and to what degree they represent a complicated financial system). The tax rate tt
is the average tax rate faced by individuals in a given year including contributions
to the social security system.
The estimation results vary greatly across the different sectors. In general we get
better results for the labor markets than for the goods market. As mentioned earlier,
these results must just be taken as illustrations of the econometric model discussed
in the paper. The model itself has too little flexibility to give good estimates in all
markets and the data are in many cases poor.
Estimation of money demand was done using OLS, mainly because the short
time series available required a parsimonious econometric model. The results are
presented in table 4. Money demand of individuals and firms in the public and
traded goods sector are estimated reasonably, though the Durbin-Watson statistic
indicates the presence of positive autocorrelation. The income variable C° is found
in general to be the most important determinant of money demand. Since these
demand functions represent reduced form equations resulting from a complicated
system, it is difficult to be sure which sign all the coefficients should have. Even so,
one would expect most of the parameters to be positive.
57
al	 -0.56516
a21
	 0.00085
a22
	 0.00172
a23
	 0.00063
a24
	 0.00038
a3	 -0.00007
15.26
(12	 37.11
-(13 	 15.21
(14	 12.43
cc 	 - 0.43
ci
=
 
Œ21
 log ((1 - tt)tDit)
	0.154 	 -3.67
	
0.00015
	
5.71
	
0.00073
	
2.36
	
0.00007
	
9.23
	
0.00010
	 3.79
	
0.00003	 -2.37
	
2.57
	
5.95
	
14.71
	
2.52
	
2.19
	 6.95
	
3.39	 3.66
	
2.74	 -0.16
an a21
- ilia +
(R2: 0.89 DW: 0.49)
st -1-- -log ((1 - 4)11)20- 112- - -911- fhet ient2.	 a22
	 a22 	 a22
(R2 : 0.44 DW: 0.89)
= 2--;3-log((1 - 4)11)30 - -*;
	 ?het 1,13t
(R2: 0.94 DW: 0.80)
sit =	 ((I - 4)11)40 -
	 -	 fizet 151 14tŒ24 	 a24
(R2 : 0.70 DW: 0.89)
Dft =	 Pt +	 fizet 195t
(R2 : 0.67 DW: 0.82)
= 0
Table 5: ML estimation of individual labor supply and demand for goods 1976-1991
Parameter Estimated Standard t-statistic
error
al	 o
an	 0.00083	 0.00016	 5.13
a22	 0.00162	 0.00074	 2.20
a23	 0.00061	 0.00007	 8.48
azt
	0.00036	 0.00099	 3.64
a3	 -0.00007	 0.00003	 -2.47
al	 8.48	 2.03	 4.19
li2	 28.75	 14.66	 1.96
Et3	 8.39	 1.47	 5.70
-d4	 5.44	 2.50	 2.18
Ec	 - 6.63	 2.56	 -2.59
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An especially worrying result is that the parameter 742 is significantly negative
(the t-statistics should of course be used very carefully considering the many indi-
cations that our model is incorrectly specified). This implies that an increase in
(b3t will increase the individuals' supply of labor to sectors other than sector 3. (a
decrease in nict decreases the reservation wage in these sectors). The estimation
of money demand in the non-traded and oil and gas sectors leads to few signifi-
cant estimates. This together with the high R2 indicates serious multicollinearity
problems.
Estimation of the individuals' supply of labor to the four sectors has been done
using maximum-likelihood estimation with the estimated results for money from
table 3 being used to calculate instruments for the endogenous money variables.
These estimation results are given in table 5. Note that the common parameter a i
is derived simultaneously from these equations. The fit is fairly good according to
the t-statistics with all the parameters except Ec being significant. If we consider
the parameter restrictions which applied to the utility and production functions
discussed earlier, then we see that the parameter a l , relating the influence of money
demand on labor supply, has the wrong sign. The individuals' labor has therefore
also been estimated under the restriction that a l = O. Results from this estimation
are given in the lower part of table 5. The R2 and Durbin-Watson statistics are
approximately the same in the two cases. Both estimations lead to estimates of
the parameters a2 1 to a24 of the right sign and size. The Durbin-Watson statistics
imply that there is positive autocorrelation in most the estimated equations. This
also indicates that the variances are probably underestimated. Since the results
presented here are only meant to be illustrative, we do not pursue this using more
sophisticated estimation techniques. Instead we simply conclude that important
shortcomings of the model are the dynamic properties and the specification and
interpretation of money demand.
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Table 6: ML estimation of the firms' demand for labor and goods 19764991 
Parameter Estimated Standard t-statistic
error
lt
	ß21
=	 +	 ihfit + Per: kit +1,m
(R2 : 0.95 DW: 0.91)
DzA
i =	 t " 15-11-4	 fh	 iflt 61-04 	+1,s1tt	 /341	 t44 	 t+41
(R2: 0.99 DW: 1.49)
0.3618
-0.0003
0.7054 -
0.12E-06
4.9022
-17.30
-98.37
0.1179
0.0002
0.8533
0.3E-07
0.7618
16.49
15.15
011
021
/331
041
051
-61
ail
3.07
-1.59
0.83
4.10
6.43
-1.05
-6.49
.1) 12t = - 0-712;100)2t
	 + V121 fhf2t	 -k2t + 1,22t
(R2 : 0.60 DW: 1.14)
	/ 312	 -0.9215
	 0.6179	 -1.49
	022
	 0.0004	 0.0004	 1.04
	 3
	 3.4040
	
0.7304	 4.66
	-62	 -49.44
	
11.67	 -4.24
Dim = - 0-1;-- 3-10g/D3t +
	 filf3t + fi-1 K3t +1,23t
(R2 : 0.97 DW: 1.31)
	013	 3.9434	 5.2671	 0.75
	 2 	 -0.0009	 0.0012	 -0.75
	033	 -2.0267	 6.2585	 -0.32
	b3 	-14.51	 42.60	 -0.34
D iu =	 /4.1„ + f334 fhifu f,36-11- ku 1924t
(R2 : 0.66 DW: 0.80)
DIA, -	 p-t !tin 1-
- p44 log - -
	 1,44
014 f4t -r ft kit + '654tr•-44
(R2: 0.97 DW: 1.71)
014	 0.2596	 0.0127	 20.39
024	 -0.0001	 0.6E-04	 -1.84
034	 -0.9725	 1.1724	 -0.83
044	 0.5E-07	 0.1E-07	 4.60
/354	 0.1682	 0.3646	 0.43
	
13.15	 21.55	 0.61
Ef4	 -6.79	 6.31	 -1.08
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If one views the inclusion of money in the utility and production functions as
arising from an underlying dynamic optimization behavior, as in for example section
3.2 of Andreassen (1993), then the above two shortcomings can both be seen to
reflect the same fact that the model does not adequately reflect the underlying
dynamics. Money enters the utility and production functions (which more properly
should be viewed as indirect functions where intertemporal considerations have been
maximized out) even though money has no intrinsic value. It's importance is as a
means of transferring purchasing power over time.
A tentative conclusion is therefore that future research should concentrate on
extending the above framework to a dynamic setting. In general this will involve
looking at the formation of expectations, price and wage determination and at how
these are reflected in an economy's financial markets.
While far from satisfactory, the estimation results for the individuals' labor sup-
ply is better than what was found for the firms' demand for labor. Table 6 gives
the results from maximum-likelihood estimation for the firms' demand for labor and
goods.
For the public sector and the oil and gas sector it was possible to simultane-
ously estimate the demand for labor and for goods. In the case of the traded and
non-traded goods sectors this leads to some coefficients not being estimated due
to singularity of the data. For these two sections we therefore only report single
equation estimates of the labor demand equations.
The results are generally characterized by low significance levels, especially in
the non-traded goods sector, and low Durbin-Watson statistics, implying positive
autocorrelation. As for the individuals' supply of labor and demand for goods, the
high R2-s indicate high multicollinearity in the data. One might note that the money
variable seems better behaved than in the case of the individuals and that the wage
does not significantly affect labor demand.
The conclusions drawn from this are largely the same as those derived from
looking at the equations characterizing the individuals' behavior. There is a need
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for a better understanding of the underlying dynamics. In the case of the firms this
includes taking explicitly into account investment behavior, leading to the capital
variable k capturing some of the firms dynamic considerations.
An attempt was made to estimate both the supply and demand for labor at
the aggregate level. For the individuals' supply of labor and demand for goods the
maximum-likelihood procedure did not converge, and for the firms' demand for labor
and goods some coefficients were not estimated. Disaggregation lead therefore to
more satisfactory results. One might therefore speculate that further disaggregation
might lead to a further improvement in results. One might for example look at sev-
eral types of goods, instead of aggregating all private goods together, or disaggregate
individual labor supply by educational level.
The above results illustrate how the method presented can be used, but it is
apparent that much further research is needed before it can become a useful econo-
metric tool. In addition it is necessary to have better data than those used above.
7 Summary
This paper has presented an aggregation method based on a stochastic approach
using virtual prices which has lead to aggregate relationships which can be used
for estimation and to describe disequilibrium in the labor market. The method
developed is explicitly multi-market, enabling one to analyze different submarkets
simultaneously. The labor market was divided into aggregate submarkets, where we
assumed that a given subset of the parameters in the utility and production functions
were equal for the agents within one submarket. The remaining parameters, money
holdings and the capital stock were assumed to be distributed across each submarket
in such a way that the conditional demand and supply functions (conditional on
a set of transactions) were extreme value distributed. These assumptions allow
us to aggregate across each labor submarket, making it possible to identify the
parameters in the model using mainly aggregate data. Identification was obtained
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using assumptions of separability and a knowledge of the reduced form structure of
the demand for money.
The econometric model derived in this paper rests on a set of fairly strict assump-
tions. These may seem implausible, but enable us to derive fairly simple aggregate
relationships based on explicit utility and profit maximization. One of the funda-
mental insights of past work on aggregation is that almost any macro economic
structure can be generated by a "reasonable" micro economic structure. It is pos-
sible that it in the future will be deemed preferable to specify the macroeconomic
structure directly instead of basing it on aggregation over micro units, but at present
we know too little about what type of aggregate macroeconomic structure should
be used. In an economy where prices do not clear the markets and where there
is rationing, the specification and interpretation of aggregate relationships depends
heavily on how rationing is distributed among individuals and firms. This paper
can be viewed as a tentative step towards a better understanding of how different
distributions of technology and tastes (and thereby of rationing) influence such ag-
gregate relationships. The results obtained indicate that the main shortcoming of
the present approach is the lack of dynamic specification. A more sophisticated
modeling of the agents' intertemporal behavior, including the formation of expecta-
tions, price and wage formation and investment behavior, would therefore seem to
be an important area for future research.
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A Deriving aggregate expressions using the GEV
distribution
A.1 The probabilities discussed in section 5
In the following we derive the aggregate expressions presented in section 5. In the
same manner as in that section, we drop the subscripts denoting type of consumer
and type of firm. In section 4 we found the following equations (equations (4.22)
and (4.24):
log (1f+ 1) — iç • pa = S eiik,
	
(A.1)
and
log (//2, + 1) — ic • yik = D — E2ik,
where
1
S = — [log ((1 — t i )e-v) — — /Tic],
a2
1
=	 -F b+
P2
1	 1 I
Elik = (lç	 )Pik	 012ik aluii),
a2	 a2
1	 1
E2ik = (IC -	 (
	
[31V1k 03kV 4k) -$2 	02
We now start with the probability given in equation (5.5),
(A.2)
(A.3)
(A.4)
(A.5)
(A.6)
P(17k
 > I 17k > 0)
= P(max(E i — , 62 - D) < 63 — z I max(e i — S,e2 — D) < e
P(ei — S < e3 — z,e2 — D < 63 -
P(E i — S < e3 , E2	 < 63) (A.7)
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where z = log Ci + 1) and 17k
 is the transacted amount of labor. The stochastic
variables e l , 62, and 63 are jointly distributed according to the generalized extreme
value distribution expressed as
F(61 10,6210,6310)	 exp(—H(e110,6210,6310)).	 (A.8)
where H(6 1 10,6210,6310) is a nonnegative function which has the property e-z H(71. —
— - z) = H(71 , 72, 73). As any one of the arguments go towards infinity, H
will do so also. The marginal distributions of the variables E l , 62 , and 63 are extreme
valued. The extreme value distribution can be obtained as the limiting distribution
(as n -4. oo) of the largest value among n independent random variables each having
the same distribution. In this sense the extreme value distribution plays the same
role concerning maxima (minima) as the normal distribution plays concerning aver-
ages. For a more detailed discussion of the extreme value distribution see Galambos
((1978).
For analytical convenience we introduce the transformed variables Si
 = (Ei —
S)10, S2 = (62 — D)I0, and ,53 = (63 — z)10. The distribution function F* for these
transformed variables can be written'
F* ( 6.11 02, 453)
F(61 +	 +52 D/0 , 83 + 419)
exp(-1451. SI0, 62 + DIO, 83 +	 (A.9)
The first step is to find an expression for the numerator in equation (A.7), P(6 i —S <
63 — Z,62 — D < 63 z) = P(61 < å3,å2 < 63). We have that
6 Note that the Jacobian determinant of the transformation from the 45-s to the c-s equals 1.
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P(61 < S3 ,å2 < (53)
Eop(s,<Y, 62 < 53 E dY)
= E0 F;(Y, y,
00
= —	 exp(—e-Y1/(S/0, DI0,0))e-Y dy 113 (510,D10, 0),
co
H3(SIO,D10,0)
H(SIO,D10, H(SIO,D10, 0))
-00   
H3 (S/19, S/O, 0) (A.10)
11(SIO,D19,0) •
where we have used the property that e-v H(71 — y,72 -
 Y,1'3 - y) = H(71, 'Y2,73)-
The functions .F3 and H3 are the derivatives of F* and H with respect to the third
argument.
According to section 5 the function H is specified as
H(6110,E210,E310) =	 Ce2/61T e-€3 /9 ,	 (A.11)
where r > 0 is a parameter. This specification implies that the stochastic variables
Ei and 62 are independent of 63 and that var e l = var 62 = var 63. The interpretation
of T is as 72 =
 i — corr(ei, 62).
From equations (A.10) and (A.11) we obtain
e-z/9
	
P(6 1 — S < 63 — z, 62 — D < 63 — z)   (A.12)(e-SIGT e-D/91T
The probability of /7k being positive is derived by setting z =
 O (7z =	 z = 0)
in the expression above,
13 (17k > 0) = P (61 — S < 63, 62 D < 63)
66
1 (A.13)
1 -I- (e-s/e'r
	
e_D/9i-)T'
and the conditional probability P(Vick > š I Pick > 0) is thereby given by
P(17k > I
 1ik > 0)
1	 czie
P(17k > 0) e-zle	 -slor e-DoT
1 
	  (A.14)
P(Pick > 0) e-logii-ive (e-soT e-Dier)r
The probability P(log(17k
 + 1) > h I l > CI) can be found by transforming the
variable i to h = log( -I- 1) to get
P(logYrk + 1) > h rick > 0) = pyrk >i 	--H3(4, P, 
exP(h) -1 
	u bf	 9 	 )
H(1 D exp(h)-1N9 , 9 )
1	 e-hle
P(4`k > 0) e—hie (e—Sier e-Dier) •
Earlier in the paper we defined the Clower supply and demand variables lfic and
if,
 which denote desired supply and demand given the realized transactions of the
agents. Following the same method as above we can derive the probabilities that
these conditional supplies and demands are positive as
NIL >	 = p (E 1 - < 63 )
oo,
H(1-4 , oo,  
(A.16)
and
e-so
Pek
 > 0) = P(E 2 — D < 63 )
— H3(oo, ,0)
H(oo, ,
(A.15)
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(A.17)
1 e-D/6•
The probability that supply is greater than demand in a micro market when
supply is greater than zero is given by
= P(6	 S < E2ik 137 6lik S < 63ik)
= P(Eiik S < Eaik) — P(Elik — S > E2ik D ,	 — S < E3ik)
= P(Elik S E3ik) P(elik S > 62ik — D)
	-FP(Elik — S > 62jk —	 Elik S > 63ik)
=	 > 0) - (1 - p(l > if)) P(41: < 10, 7 < 0)	 (A.18)
The probability P(a > 0) was found above and P(ifk > lß) is given by
P(a > ipk )
= P(e i
 — S < e2 — D)
= P (81 < (52)
=	 P (Si < z, 452 E dz)
= i._. F;(z, z oo)dz
112(, -3- co) 
	11(1,	 oo)
exp(—DI(0 r)) 
exp(— S (0 r)) exp(— D (0 r))
1 (A.19)
1 (exp (D S)) 11(9
The last probability in equation (A.18) is given by 
P (1::Syt ic < 	 < 	 = P(eik — S > 62ik D ,e1k S > E3ik)
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(e—S/(97-) 	 e—D/(0r) y-1 —.V(e'r )
(e—S/(01-) e— D/(0-0) +1
(A.20)
= P(å2 < 511 (53 <
—111(SIO,D10, 0) 
H(SIO,D10, 0)
Substituting in from equations A.16), (A.19), and (A.20) into equation A.18) and
rearranging gives us
p(iL > ipk,a > o)
= F (1fk > 0) —	 — P(1,1, 1:9 )) P(qk > 0).	 (A.21)
A.2 The expected values En I l > 0) and E(wik
 I l'z'ck >13)
We now derive the expected value of /71, when 17k > O. Using the results above we
have':
E(17k 17k > 0) = Jo P(rik > I	 > 0) di
1 1  H3 ( ,	 log (i+1) foo
P(/7k > 0) JO	 +1	 6	 diHes , pc, log vi-1) )
S
P(t> 0) (log H( -19-S , 79 -D , 0) — log 	 t-9 00)) -	 (A.22)il
Assuming that H(6 1 10,6219,6310) has the same specification as before we get
E(17k 1 17k > 0) o 	1 P(17 > 0) (log (P(17 >
—log (p(lrk
 > 0) 1))  
7We use the fact that for any probability distribution f with the corresponding cumulative
distribution function F we have that E x = Lc° æf (x) dx =	 (1 F(s)) dx
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E( Ifk I IS  > 0) —0 log > 0))	 (A.24)P(Ifk
 >
and
-0 
P(lr> 0) log (1 — P(qk > 0)) ,	 (A.23)k 
where P(rik  > 0) is given by equation (A.13). In the same manner we can derive the
expected Clower demands and supplies conditional on these demands and supplies
being positive,
E(ig	 > 0)
	
> log ( 1. Pek >	 ,
	 (A.25)
and conditional on the transacted quantity being positive,
and
	—0 	 (1 d- exp(—S/9)E(d
	 0)I	 _	 =-- r)(1 >
	
log
	 exp(_sio) (A.26)
—0 	(1 + exp(—D10
	Egk' I > 0) =
	
(A.27)P(PA > 0) *Log exp( —D10) )
From equations (A.23), (A.24), and (A.25) we see that when the probabilities P(rik >
0), P(qk > 0), and P(lR > 0) are small then E(rik I l > 0) P.,- E(ifk I 1fic > 0)
E(lß
 I iß > 0) 0.
The expected value of the logarithm of la conditional on transactions being
positive is given by
E(log(qk + 1) I rik
 >0)
=
 I P (log(1 sik + 1) > h lsick > 13) dh
Jo
(S D exp(h)-1 
	 00
	3 k-6
	e	 dh
P(irk > 0) Jo	 H(1, El-, ex l4eh)-1 
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o SD(exp(0) log	 0) — exp(—co) log H(-,	 co)) .P (1 sik
 > 0)
—o
= 
P(17k > 0) log (1) (1.7k >	 . (A.28)
In deriving the expected value of wik when 171, > 0, we start with the decomposi-
tion wik = tbexp(pik) in equation (4.20) and the extreme valued stochastic variable
63 = Ktlik - Taken together these lead to the following expression for E(tvik
 I Vick > 0):
E( wik I 	 > O) = co E ( e31' I lCk > 0) .
p (l,k
	0) 
0o
.
K P (Si <
 Y, 62 < y, 63/0 E dy)
0.
D(1* > 0) 1-0. ev. F3 (y, y, Ody
P(17> 0) H3(7_,D , _0_ , 	e_yo._§,z) exx_e_y+A) dy, (A.29)
where A = log H(i, , 0). Introducing the variable g = exp(—y -F A) leads to
E(wik I 1:k > 0)
S	 0° 1	 0
	 H3(—,—, f	 exp((log — A)(1. — —)	 clg
- P (lik > 0)	 19 19	 o y
D S	 00	
-
= 
P(Irk > 0) e-A(1-0 H3( , -I-9 , 0) jo üe dý
= p(irk > 0)
	i' 0) {exp (— log H( T) , 0) (1 —
—CODS S
From the definition of H(E i /O, E210 63 16 ) it is apparent that
)1 r . (A.30)
S	 0
exp[—log (-0 , --19- , 0) (1 —	 =(13(qk > 0))1- 	(A.31)
From (A.11), A.30), and (A.31) we thus get
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E(w
 I l'ick >	 = z-b(P(qk > c )r'in F (1 — —°)
	
(A.32)
A.3 Deriving an expression for the second order moment
In section 5 of the paper it is stated that if we have knowledge of the variables
E(wik
 I rick > 0), E(td I 1 > 0), and /9 we can determine the parameter K. The
expression E(td I 17k
 > 0) can be derived in the same manner as E(wik
 I 1:k > 0)
and it is readily seen that
E(td I rick > 0) = fo- 2E(e72,•E3 1 17k > a)
w-2
I e '1'12 F3 (y,y,y)dyP(171, > 0)
260
t1/2 [P (rick > o)] 	r
(1
0) (A.33)
Hence equations (A.32) and (A.33) imply that
1	 1
—
2 
log E(qk I l > 0) — log E(wik
 I Pik > 0) = —2 log
Since the following applies in general
(ro. _
r(1 _ gry . (A.34)
(A.35)
1 log E(w& I rick > Cs) — log E(wik
 I 1 > 0)
log (1 var(wik I 17k > CO\
E(qk /7k > 0) )
we obtain
1 + var(wik I l , > 0) 
E(qk I 17k > 0 )
26;i) 
F(1 _ .D2 (A.36)
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which is a non-linear equation in 01K. Due to the fact that the function is in-
creasing amd convex it can be demonstrated that (A.36) determines OIK uniquely
provided 01K < 0.5.
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